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Introduction to the Italian Legal System.  The Allocation 
of Normative Powers: Issues In Law Finding 
 
 
MARINELLA BASCHIERA∗ 
 
 
Introduction 
 
I.1. A choice: the use of comparative methodology to describe one’s own 
national legal system. 
 
In this paper I will try to describe my country’s legal system through 
the lens of comparison. Before turning to the specific topic I have decided to 
explore, I will give an account of the reasons why I have preferred 
comparative methodology to portray the Italian legal system instead of 
referring to traditional partitions of law or to abstract normative declensions 
of the category “sources of law.” 
 
The first reason is related to three characteristics which are specific to 
the comparative method: functionality, flexibility of the categories applied 
and openness to observation of the borderline materials which, though not 
strictly legal, nonetheless interact with legal sources and may play a 
significant role in the arena of law in action.1 Comparative studies generally 
aim either at discussing the solutions given to a specific problem by two or 
more legal systems (micro-comparison), or at analysing the general legal 
issues or institutions belonging to each of the different legal environments 
under scrutiny (macro-comparison).  
 
Following the former perspective, comparative lawyers will focus 
their attention not only on the sources of law, but also on the techniques and 
                                                 
∗ I would like to thank Prof. Ziller and Mrs. Nijenstein for the invitation to 
take part in the IALL Annual Conference. I am also indebted to Joan Rius-Riu and 
Michele Cozzio for the useful discussions on some of the ideas presented in the 
paper; many thanks to my Maestri for the gift of  time. The usual disclaimer 
applies. 
1 The reference to the three distinctive features of the comparative method does 
not here imply any general methodological assumption: in fact there is no uniformity 
of views among scholars on this specific issue. Some  methodological options are 
discussed in VAN HOECKE, M. (ed.) Epistemology and Methodology of 
Comparative Law, Oxford and Portland Oregon,  Hart Publishing,  2004.  
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styles of legislation, the methods of interpretation and the functions performed 
by the different formants, to mention but a few of the recurring issues. In the 
latter case, comparative lawyers select a problem or a legal institution and 
compare factual patterns and rules, the functions played by the different actors 
in the legal arena in order to understand the different solutions provided by 
each legal system to the problem selected. In order to achieve their aim(s) 
they have to deal with both linguistic and content-related discontinuities 
between the legal systems under scrutiny and try to focus on essential 
similarities beneath the apparent differences or, if necessary, on the profound 
differences beneath the apparent similarities. Hence, the research pattern will 
concentrate on functionality, pursuing the specification of those juridical 
elements that work in a functionally equivalent manner in the selected legal 
systems.2 From the functional approach there also stems the procedure of 
building a loose structure of concepts and categories that would allow the 
identification and analysis of the functional equivalents. These peculiar 
aspects of a comparatist’s task resemble the undertakings of a librarian,  “who 
needs a supranational system of concepts if he is to arrange his foreign 
materials in topical categories rather than simply in national groupings.”3   
 
The second justification for the choice of the comparative option 
stems from the very nature of the topic under discussion and is connected to 
the aforementioned third feature of comparative analysis of law. By the term 
“system” we refer to: a complex set of elements organically related to one 
another; a set of principles and propositions logically connected to each other 
and related to a scientific discipline.4 In Western tradition and in particular in 
Romano-Germanic legal culture both definitions have been applied to legal 
systems5: the idea of an organic body of rules and institutions endowed with 
                                                 
2 For a critical assessment of the functional pattern see in particular SAMUEL, G. 
“Epistemology and Comparative Law: Contributions from the Sciences and Social 
sciences”, in VAN HOECKE, M. (2004) supra fn.1, at pp.35-77. Samuel also 
accounts for the hermeneutical approach to comparative studies fostered by Pierre 
Legrand; the two epistemological options are definitively evaluated in view of the 
debate on the harmonisation of European law. 
3 See ZWEIGERT, K. KÖTZ, H. Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd revised 
ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998, at p. 45. The functional approach to comparative 
research is explained at pp.43-44.  
4 See MODUGNO, F., heading ‘Sistema Giuridico’, in Enciclopedia Giuridica, 
Vol.XXIX, Rome, Istituto della Enciclopedia Giuridica Treccani fondata da Giovanni 
Treccani, 1993. 
5 From the sixteenth century onwards the Latin word “systema” began to denote 
academic theories of law; later it also came to denote the law itself as both an object 
of systematization and its results. In Renaissance thought  we may find traces of the 
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an inner rationality and obeying pre-determined principles of logics is deeply 
rooted in civil law’s tradition, to the point of being widely assumed as one of 
its distinctive hallmarks.6 Comparative law has devoted extensive attention to 
                                                                                                                    
“esprit de système” as a unitary set of elements characterized by inner rationality, 
even though the first account of the legal system described as a rational and stable 
organic body is due to Christian Wolff, in his major work “Jus Naturae methodo 
scientifica pertractatum” (1740-1748). The echo of Cartesian  notions, borrowed 
from mathematics and applied to law led to the creation of a so called mos 
geometricus, aimed at finding rational and immutable justifications for the sovereign 
authority of the state.  Friedrich Carl Von  Savigny referred to the law as a system, i. 
et an organic set of concepts, institutions, social relationships and praxes endowed 
with an inherent principle of order. In his view this inherent ordering principle also 
constituted the logical basis for the scientific systematization of legal institutions and 
rules; see VON SAVIGNY, F.C. System des heutigen römischen Recht (1840-1849); 
see LARENZ, K. Methodenlehre der Rechtswisswnschaft (1960), Italian translation 
Storia del metodo nella scienza giuridica, Milan, Giuffrè, 1966, p.16.  The evolution 
of the concept is analysed in depth by MODUGNO, F., (1993) supra fn.1, p.3-12. An 
account of the philosophical trajectories of civil law jurisprudence might be found 
also in BARBERIS, M. Filosofia del diritto, Bologne,, Il Mulino, 1993. The 
relationship between philosophy and legal science is nevertheless complex and often 
debated:. As regards Italian legal science, see the impressive description provided by 
MERRYMAN, J. “The Italian Style I: doctrine”, 18 Stanford Law Review, 39 (1965-
1966): 39-65. On this  point, Merryman acknowledges the “schism” between 
philosophy and legal science which is still present in the Italian legal culture.  
6 See ZWEIGERT, K. KÖTZ, H. (1998) supra fn. 3, at p. 69: “Another hallmark 
of a legal system or family is a distinctive mode of legal thinking…[…] on the 
Continent the system is conceived as being complete and free from gaps, in England 
lawyers feel their way gradually from case to case.” . See also  VAN HOECKE, M. 
WARRINGTON, M.  “Legal cultures, legal paradigms and legal doctrine: a new 
model for comparative law”, in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 47 
(1998): 495-536: “In comparison with the other three legal cultures, we can 
distinguish two principal characteristics of Western legal culture: individualism and 
rationalism…[…] [T]he law, for Europeans, is above all a system, a form of logic, a 
geometry, a coherent assembly where everything can be reduce to principles, to 
concepts and to categories”, at p.504. For the importance of the theoretical layer of 
law in the development of civil law systems see, as first reference, SAWER, G. The 
Western Conception of Law, in  International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, The 
Legal systems of the World. Their Comparison and unification, Vol.II, Chapt. I, , 
J.C.B. Tübingen -Mohr, The Hague- Mouton, 1975: 14-48; See also DAVID, R. , 
BRIERLEY, J.E.C., Major Legal Systems in The World Today, 3rd ed., London, 
Stevens and Sons, 1985, where the paramount importance of the doctrinal formant is 
clearly acknowledged: “The idea of law such it was understood for centuries in 
European universities has not been abandoned. The legislators can, and indeed must, 
aid in defining the law, but the law itself is something more than legislation. It is not 
to be confused with the will of legislators; it can only be discovered by the combined 
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the problem of identifying the hallmarks of legal systems, with a view both to 
selecting relevant materials for comparison and clarifying its own 
methodology. In doing so, it has brought to the surface the ideological layer 
present in the legal systems, whose meaning is tailored by lawyers’ 
interpretation.7 In other words the legal system has proved to be a static image 
(eidolon) of a constantly variable set of institutions, rules and social praxis 
(internal dimension). Furthermore, the internal legal order is influenced by 
phenomena of “contamination” resulting from its interaction with different 
legal systems, at the supranational and the international level (external 
dimension).  
 
These assumptions imply that the description of a legal system has to 
be geared not only to the legal order set up by the sources of the law but also 
to those legal phenomena that engender its transformation; moreover the 
account has to make explicit the ideological layer of the system.8 If these 
assumptions are kept in mind, the use of ‘rules of thumb’ derived from 
comparative law is likely to contribute to the achievement of two important 
goals: 
 
a) a set of flexible concepts will be of great help to foreigners 
who are to deal with the substance of a legal system, since 
they allow the observer to go beyond the technicalities and the 
ideological layers of the system as accounted for in national 
legal culture; 
b) the combination of the functional and the cultural approaches 
is likely to gear the design of the legal system towards a better 
appreciation of the dynamics of the law. 
 
                                                                                                                    
efforts of all jurists… […] [I]n conformity with tradition, Romano-Germanic laws 
remain a system that can be described as a jurist’s law (Juristenrecht)” at p.106. A 
historical account is provided by VAN CAENEGEM, R.C. European Law in the Past 
and the Future. Unity and Diversity over two Millenia, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2002.   
7 With reference to the Italian system, see the analysis provided by MONATERI, 
P.G., CHIAVES, F.A. “Shifting Frames: Law and Legal Contaminations”, in 
MATTEI; U:, LENA, J.S. Introduction to Italian Law, The Hague- London- New 
York, Kluwer Law International,  2002: 21-30. 
8 See MATTEI, U. “Three patterns of law: taxonomy and change in the World’s 
Legal systems”, in American Journal of Comparative Law, 45 (1997): 5-45. On the 
conception of law as a “system of rules” and on the problem raised by this conception 
at Common Law, see TWINING, W. MIERS, D. How to do things with rules, 4th ed., 
London, Butterworths, 1999, at pp.131-156. 
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In this perspective, I will address the following two macro-questions: 
who are the actors that set the rules in the Italian legal system and how do 
they set these rules? In answering these questions I will present both 
institutional actors and quasi-institutional actors taking part in the law-making 
process; moreover, I will address the way they operate and indicate the 
discontinuities between the static legal framework provided by the 
constitutional model and the legal system “in action.” Without neglecting the 
importance attached to the contribution to legal change made by non-
institutional actors, my choice aims to highlight the balances negotiated and 
achieved in the paradigm of the separation of powers through the allocation of 
law-making functions. 
  
I.2.  General features of the Italian system 
 
Comparative lawyers have grouped legal systems in very different 
ways, depending both on the criteria used to select elements of comparison 
and on the different evaluations of the importance possessed by these 
elements.9 Different classifications might also result from the general 
approach taken, thus varying according to the main areas of law considered to 
be influential in the structuring of the legal system. 10 In line with the 
descriptive aims of this paper I will not search for original taxonomies nor I 
                                                 
9 An inventory of groupings and theories is offered by ZWEIGERT, K. KÖTZ, 
H. (1998) supra fn. 3, at p. 64-73.  Though acknowledging the “vulnerability to 
alteration” of the grouping itself according to the variables of time and private 
law/constitutional law approaches, the authors suggest a classification in four legal 
families: 1. Romanistic family; 2. Germanic family; 3. Nordic family; 4. Common 
Law family; four other legal systems are considered in separate sections: 1. People’s 
Republic of China; 2. Japanese law; 3. Islamic law; 4. Hindu Law.  Zweigert and 
Kötz believe that legal style is the distinctive hallmark of each legal system and make 
use of the following criteria to define it: a) historical background and development; b) 
characteristic mode of thought in legal matters; c) distinctive institutions; d) typology 
of legal sources; e) ideology.  David and Brierley propose the following classification 
criteria: a) techniques of enunciation of rules; b) types of sources of law; c) legal 
reasoning.  Applying these criteria the authors distinguish three main legal families 
along with a comprehensive group of “other systems”. See DAVID, R., BRIERLEY, 
J.E.C., (1985) supra fn.6, at pp.20-23. More emphasis has been  recently place on 
legal culture, especially on social practices that constitute the living layers of legal 
rules, institutions and doctrinal conceptions. In line with this approach four cultural 
families have been devised: 1. African family; 2. Asian family; 3. Islamic family; 4. 
Western family (that which has European roots). See VAN HOECKE, M., 
WARRINGTON, M., (1998) supra fn.6, at p.502. 
10 Examples of minor stream approaches may be found in RAVA, T. 
Introduzione alla civiltà europea, Padua, Cedam, 1982.  
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will apply any. Despite the variety of classification results, the Italian legal 
system is always presented as belonging either to the Romanistic family or to 
the Romano-Germanic one.11 Among classification criteria, a crucial role is 
played by the historical background, as is shown by the representation of Italy 
as the “cradle of Western legal culture;”12 other criteria commonly used to 
describe the Italian legal system are the characteristic mode of thought in 
legal matters and the typology of legal sources. Since these features seem to 
be general hallmarks of the system and their consideration is common to most 
comparative accounts I will give specific attention to an examination of each 
of them. 
 
I.2.1 Historical Background 
 
The key word, if we are to understand the reason why Italy is 
currently regarded as “the cradle of European legal culture,” is continuity. 
The historical approach to the study of the Italian legal system and in 
particular, that of its Roman Law foundations, is currently gaining new 
momentum in the perspective of the “harmonization of European private 
law.” It is assumed that the system of private law “endured the change of 
republican to imperial government under the Caesars, the rise and fall of a 
vast empire, the conversion of the people from paganism to Christianity and 
finally the shifting of the centre of government itself from Rome in the West 
to Constantinople in the East”.13 In early medieval times Roman legal 
tradition was kept alive by the Catholic Church, allowing it to survive during 
the dark ages of barbarian invasions. During the thirteenth century the study 
of Justinian’s Digest gained a new momentum with the school of the 
Glossatori di Bologna, initiated by Irnerius who happened to re-discover the 
only surviving copy of the Codex Laurentianum.  
 
It is not possible here to give a full account of such a rich historical 
process; nevertheless I would like to highlight a possible point of intersection 
between historiography and legal research which clearly shows the 
importance of the historical layer in the set-up of a legal system. Nineteenth-
century historiography placed emphasis on the peculiarities which 
characterised different national legal experiences, thus closely adhering to the 
                                                 
11 In ZWEIGERT, K. KÖTZ, H. (1998) supra fn. 3, at p.250-276; in DAVID, R. , 
BRIERLEY, J.E.C., (1985)supra fn.6, at p.97-113. In SACCO, R. Sistemi giuridici 
comparati, in SACCO, R. (gen. Ed.) Trattato di diritto comparato, Turin, Utet, 1996, 
at p.363-411. 
12 See WATKIN, T.G., The Italian legal tradition, Aldershot-Sydney, Ashgate, 
1997. 
13 See WATKIN, T., (1997), supra fn.12, at p.1. 
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political purpose of strengthening national identities. Later comparative 
studies have shown that between the fifth and the eleventh centuries there 
existed a vast area of ius commune in Europe. Seminal differentiation between 
common law system and civil law systems took place during the twelfth 
century, though this process of differentiation rested largely upon a common 
background of rules, legal language, and patterns of thought shared by 
Catholic Europe.14 According to a different analysis, the Western legal 
tradition originated in the Gregorian reform, which took place between the 
eleventh and the twelfth century, and is considered to be the common ground 
of legal culture in Europe.15  
 
The historiographical debate briefly summarized here has been 
recently challenged as being a means to support “strategies of legitimization 
of a "Western" supremacy in the field of law, through the pursuit of 
genealogies.”16 The challenge points to the "Western root" of modern law and 
aims at proving that the "tree of Western civilization” has its roots in the soil 
of many different lands. Both the scope and the relevance of the ideological 
layer lying beneath different currents of historiography are unambiguously 
revealed by the fact that the ius commune heritage has been placed at the core 
of one, among many, contributions to the current “harmonization of European 
private Law” debate.17 However, the opposite approach, that is, that of 
emphasising the common roots of Civilian tradition as opposed to the 
“isolated” development of Common law,18 might also serve ideological 
                                                 
14See LUPOI, M. Alle radici del mondo giuridico Europeo, Rome, Istituto 
Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1994. BELTON, A. (trans.) The origins of European 
Legal Order New York, Cambridge Uuniversity Press, 1999. 
15 See BERMAN, H.J. Law and Revolution The formation of the Western Legal 
Tradition, Cambridge, Massachussets, Harvard University Press, 1983. 
16See MONATERI, P.G. “Black Gaius A Quest for the Multicultural Origins of 
the "Western Legal Tradition", in Hastings Law Journal 51 (2000): 479-555 and 
references there contained. For the echo in Italian doctrine see also COSTANTINI, 
C., “L’anima apologetica della comparazione e la ‘geopolitica’  del diritto. 
Riflessioni in margine alla fondazione della Tradizione Giuridica Occidentale” in 
Rivista critica del diritto privato (2005):183-190. The author also reviews further 
publications concerning Roman Law and the critical analysis of its findings in the 
light of comparative science: see ibidem, fn. n. 3, 13 and 18. 
17 See ZIMMERMANN, R. The law of Obligations: Roman foundation of the 
Civilian Tradition, Oxford,  Oxford University Press, 1996; idem, Roman Law, 
Contemporary Law, European Law. The Civilian Tradition today, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2001, especially at 108-189.  
18 See for instance LEGRAND, P. “European Legal systems are Not 
converging”, International and  Comparative Law Quarterly, 45, (1996): 52-81. For 
a paradigmatic exercise in comparison between the structure of Gaius’ Institutiones 
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purposes, though it is generally acknowledge that the range of differentiation 
between civil law systems should not be underrated19. By way of conclusion, 
the Roman Law foundations of Italian legal system and its later developments 
in early medieval times are currently considered as playing fields where 
arguments both for and against the convergence between common law and 
civil law systems oppose and contend with one another; moreover, the 
historical and comparative approach enters into the debate on European 
private law harmonization, thus taking a step that underscores its ideological 
construction and its influence in the development of the European legal 
system.20 
 
I.2.2 Characteristic Mode of thought in legal matters  
 
Always acknowledged as a pivotal factor of differentiation between 
common law systems and civil law systems, this peculiar style of legal 
thinking has been labeled as “systematic conceptualism”, as opposed to an 
“inductive problem solving approach” that would constitute the heart of  legal 
reasoning at Common Law.21 Nevertheless, the supposed unbridgeable 
opposition must be mitigated and the description of the perspective of the 
Italian legal system to the problem of qualification might be useful in 
signaling not too slender commonalities between common law and civil law 
mode of thought in legal matters. 
 
The civilian pattern of legal reasoning might be connected both to the 
above-mentioned historical background and to the type of education system 
set up in the “Universitates studiorum” during the twelfth and thirteenth 
                                                                                                                    
and the systematisation of English Common Law, see BIRKS, P. “This heap of good 
learning: the Jurist in the common Law tradition”, in MARKESINIS, B. (ed.), Law 
making, Law finding and Law Shaping. The diverse influences”, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1997, 113-138. 
19 The variety of practical solutions offered by European legal systems to a given 
issue in contract law, for instance, has been explained by appealing to historical 
arguments, such as the different layers contained in the Digest, the interpretation of 
classical jurists offered by Justinian and the process of “generalization of rules and 
institutions, concepts and criteria [which] is a characteristic feature of the civilian 
tradition”: see ZIMMERMANN, R. (2001) supra fn.17, at p.113. 
20 See ZIMMERMANN, R. (2001) supra fn.17, at p.187-189. 
21 See ZWEIGERT, K. And KÖTZ, H. (1998) supra fn. 3, at p. 259. Anyhow “ 
one of the weaknesses of many traditional accounts of legal interpretation is that they 
concentrate, explicitly or implicitly on a single standpoint – typically that of the 
impartial judge or of a neutral expositor”: in TWINING, W. MIERS, D.(1999) supra 
fn.8, at p.171. 
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century. Two main constituents of early European legal education had a 
seminal influence on the development of a distinctive mode of thought: on the 
one hand, the study of law was mainly pursued by doctores, that is, professors 
at Universities; on the other hand, the presence of a text endowed with 
authority/prestige qualified the methods used to interpret it and, therefore, 
also conditioned the development of legal doctrines. This element had an 
impact on the style of the judiciary, but it also led to a process of 
differentiation between two broad categories of interpreters of a legal text (the 
doctrine and the judges) which evolved in two different formants that have 
contributed to the substantial creation of legal rules up to the present times.22 
On the one hand, the doctrine interprets legal texts by employing the tools 
provided by logic; in doing so it appeals to subjacent conceptions of justice 
which work as a common frame of reference that is functional to the 
understanding of the law itself.23 On the other hand, judges need to identify 
the relevant facts under discussion in order to come up with a rule on the case; 
the selection of relevant facts in the case is functional to their identification 
with an abstract pattern of facts provided by the law.24 Once the applicable 
fact pattern is identified, the process of qualification is completed by applying 
the rule to the case in hand.   
 
We may find that at common law the distinction between “questions 
of facts,” “question of law” and “questions of mixed facts and law,” blurred as 
it comes out from the analysis of case law, is often used as a ‘purpose 
oriented’ instrument. In practice, it has been acknowledged, “treating a 
question as on of fact allows the law to reflect cultural standards as they vary 
across time and place, to be applied relatively easily by lay magistrates or 
juries…[…]…To counter the criticism that the law will be uncertainly and 
inconsistently applied, a question may instead be treated as one of law.”25 
                                                 
22 See ASCHERI, M. Tribunali, giuristi e istituzioni. Dal Medioevo all’Età 
moderna, Bologne, Il Mulino, 1989. 
23 See RESCIGNO, G. U. “Il giurista come scienziato”, in Diritto Pubblico 
(2003):833-864. The paper describes the general outlines of a jurist’s work in order to 
show it has scientific status.  As pivotal characteristics of jurists’ discourse, Rescigno 
examines: a. philological enquiry; b. logic test; argumentative exposition: at pp.841-
847. 
24 The process of logic applied is known as “subsumption” and it  aims at 
bringing the case under a rule. For a clear picture of methods and problems 
concerning the interpretation and application of legal rule at Common Law, see 
TWINING, W. MIERS, D. (1999) supra fn.8, at p.157-220.  
25 See TWINING, W. MIERS, D. (1999) supra fn.8, at p.163-164. An illustration 
of examples is provided in ZWEIGERT, K. And KÖTZ, H. (1998) supra fn. 3, at p. 
259. 
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This purpose-oriented method of interpretation does not differ substantially 
from that of the Civil law tradition, at least as far as the approach and 
purposes are concerned. 
 
I.2.3 Typology of legal sources 
 
This criterion of classification, though very popular, has proven to 
be unsatisfactory when applied either to specific subject matters or to 
definite issues. The main reason for this inadequacy has to be imputed to a 
necessary characteristic of the legal discourse on the sources of law, which 
has devised its rationale in the interpretation of the norms governing the 
lawmaking processes.26 Consequently, an analysis based on the sources 
formally acknowledged would not reflect the actual state of law in action 
and the functionality pattern is illuminating on this point. 
 
The inadequacy of the criterion is even more evident if applied to 
the problem under scrutiny, since both the allocation of legislative power 
and the scope of the traditional systematisation of legislative acts as 
sources of law (“atti-fonte”) have undergone seminal transformation in the 
Italian legal system.27  
 
II. Law Making 
 
A taxonomy of the sources of law is expressly provided in art.1 of the 
Preliminary disposition of the Italian Civil code. They are hierarchically 
ordered as follows: a. statutes; b. secondary regulations; c. usages. However, 
the promulgation of Italian Constitution changed the features of hierarchical 
order among sources of law and acted directly upon the contents of specific 
sectors of the legal systems. Moreover, the implementation of the new 
institutional design led to distinctive political practices and to peculiar 
arrangements of balance between the institutional powers which, in turn, gave 
way to major developments in legislative actions.  
                                                 
26 My claim here is that the formal theory of the sources of law does not provide 
an illuminating picture of the legal system in action, thus it cannot be used 
heuristically in the framework of this study. However, the standpoint taken by 
constitutional lawyers on this point has to be assessed with a view to clearing 
fundamental issues about competence, hierarchy, validity and conflict. On this point 
see PIZZORUSSO, A, FERRERI, S. Le fonti del diritto Italiano. vol.I,  Le fonti 
scritte, in SACCO, R. (gen. ed.) Trattato di diritto Civile, Turin,, UTET, 1998, at 
p.37-39. 
27 The analytical description of the written sources of law see PIZZORUSSO, A, 
FERRERI, S., (1998) supra, fn.26, at pp.16-27 and at pp.73-187.   
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If we now turn to the substance itself of the processes of law 
finding, attention at first should be directed to the role of written 
legislation, in the form of statutes and legislative acts. However, in this 
respect, and taking into account mainly the private law system, it must be 
acknowledged that a pivotal re-adjustment in the shape of the role played 
by judges, who became increasingly influential in law making, has taken 
place in the Italian legal system. This process was also accompanied by a 
movement of de-codification that occurred in the ‘80s due to a continuous 
flow of legislative reforms, especially in the private law sub-sectors. 
Arguably, a counter-movement of re-codification is currently occurring, so 
that the pendulum is swinging back to such an extent that some 
commentators believe that the Civil Code has re-gained its role as focal 
point of the Italian private law system. Moreover, the fact that this process 
has been complemented by an independent – but not un-influential – 
process of ‘codification’ of administrative law proves that at least the idea 
of comprehensive written legislation is still a staple feature of the Italian 
legal system.28 
  
II.1.1 The relationship between the Constitution and ordinary legislation  
 
The Italian Constitution came into force on 1 January 1948, thus 
setting fundamental framework provisions regulating Italian political 
institutions and the legal system.29 These basic rules of law govern a 
variety of matters such as the formation, composition, term of office and 
                                                 
28 See the analysis by SACCO, R. “Il Codice Civile: un fossile legislativo?”, in 
PIZZORUSSO, A, FERRERI, S., (1998) supra, fn.26, at pp.441-470.   
29 The Italian Constitution provides for fundamental principles at art.1-12. 
The first part, (art.13-54) enshrines constitutional rights and duties in social, 
economic and political relationships. This part follows the traditional distinction 
between liberty rights (simply granted to the individual) and welfare rights 
(obliging the State to take positive action to provide the individual with the 
necessary means to exert the right). The second part of the Constitution (art.55-
139) deals with the organization of the State, setting the fundamental framework 
rules defining the limits and form of  legislative power, executive power and the 
judiciary to exert their functions.. In the fifth title of the second part fundamental 
provisions concerning Regions, provinces and city councils are laid down. In this 
part a system of check and balances on the Parliamentary form of Government is 
also established. A. direct democracy instruments: referendum (art.75) and 
citizens’ right to propose a statute (art.71, 2nd paragraph). B. Judiciary C. 
Constitutional Court. Provisional dispositions for implementation and 
interpretation are also provided. The text of the Constitution is available at the 
following website: www.quirinale.it 
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powers of the supreme bodies of the State. Hence, legislation must 
conform to constitutional rules (the vertical dimension), since they possess 
an higher rank than ordinary legislation and executive regulations; 
individuals and private entities must also conform to constitutional rules to 
varying extents, according to the functions and scope of the provision 
under scrutiny. Constitutional dispositions cannot be amended by ordinary 
legislation; a special procedure for constitutional revision is provided for 
in the Constitution itself, in order to ensure that any amendment to the 
Constitution is the outcome of a broad political consensus.30  
 
The promulgation of the Constitution did not only impose a 
hierarchical criterion in assessing the legitimacy and the scope of ordinary 
legislation. On the one hand it also profoundly changed the purport of 
existing legislation; on the other hand it gave a direct legal basis which 
allowed new political values enshrined in it to be implemented. The 
foregoing statements illustrate the meaning attributed to the scope of the 
Constitutional text and its inclusion in the categories of so-called “long 
constitutions,” but they also represent the normative portrait of the 
political project enshrined in the Constitution.31 
 
As for the former phenomenon, some of the constitutional 
provisions are regarded as having binding force as general principle. 
Therefore, they might steer the interpretation of lower ranking provisions; 
hence, judges made use of constitutional provisions in order to re-create an 
interpretative framework for ordinary legislation that would be capable of 
fulfilling the constitutional vision of social relations. A clear example is 
offered by the interpretation of art.844 of the Civil Code, which prohibits 
                                                 
30 FOR AN ANALYTICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT, SEE 
COMBA, M “CONSTITUTIONAL LAW”, IN MATTEI; U., LENA, J.S. (2002) SUPRA FN.7, 
31-62. SEE ALSO WATKIN, T.G., SUPRA FN. 13, AT P.77-95. HOWEVER, FAR FROM 
BEING RIGID IN A TECHNICAL SENSE,  THE PROCEDURE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT HAS PROVEN TO BE DEPENDENT UPON  POLITICAL CONJUNCTURES. FOR 
AN IMPARTIAL DESCRIPTION OF THE POLITICAL PROCESSES CONNECTED WITH RECENT 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS SEE D’ATENA, A.  “LA NUOVA RIFORMA DEL TITOLO V, LA 
COSTITUZIONE A RIGIDITÀ DEBOLE ED IL BIPOLARISMO DI COALIZIONE”, IN ATTI DEL 
SEMINARIO “DISEGNO DI LEGGE COSTITUZIONALE  CONTENTE MODIFICHE ALLA PARTE II 
DELLA COSTITUZIONE”,ROME, LUISS GUIDO CARLI, 16TH OF MAY  2005, AVAILABLE 
AT: HTTP://WWW.ASSOCIAZIONEDEICOSTITUZIONALISTI.IT . 
31 See briefly, PIZZETTI, F. “La ricerca del giusto equilibrio tra uniformità e 
differenza: il problematico rapporto tra il progetto originario della Costituzione del 
1948 ed il progetto ispiratore della riforma costituzionale del 2001”, in Le Regioni,4 
(2003): 599-627. 
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acts of nuisance to neighbouring landowners. A systematic interpretation 
of the Code’s provision in connection with art.42 of the Const. which 
acknowledges the “social function of private property”, was at first 
suggested by doctrine: after long debate judges agreed to the extension of 
the scope of art.844 of the Civil Code pursuant to such a systematic 
interpretation, thus affording protection to individual rights referring to 
broader social values, though still connected with private property and 
ownership, such as for instance, the right to a healthy environment.32  
 
Moreover, constitutional norms were intended as a direct legal basis 
of individual rights and obligations. The principles and values enshrined in 
the Constitution have both vertical and horizontal normative effects. Though 
still a matter of debate among constitutionalists, the horizontal effect 
(drittwirkung) of constitutional provisions might be defined as the possibility 
of a direct application of constitutional provisions in order to ensure a means 
of protection to individual rights without the need to appeal to a statute or a 
legislative act. An express acknowledgement of the principle is not enshrined 
in the Italian Constitution, as is the case of Germany, for instance, where the 
direct effect of constitutional provisions is granted in art.1, par. 3 of its 
“Fundamental Law” (Grundgesetz). However, the direct effect argument has 
been applied on several occasions by both the Italian Constitutional Court and 
the Corte di Cassazione. 
 
The Constitutional Court has made use of drittwirkung with a view 
to granting: a) protection to the individual’s right to health pursuant to art. 
32 Italian Constitution33; b) protection of the worker’s right to a minimum 
wage pursuant to art.36 Italian Constitution.34 Far from being an example 
of a piecemeal application of this principle, these judgements represent the 
purport of a more general attitude of the Constitutional Court that has: a) 
encouraged the use of drittwirkung in order to supplement deficient 
legislation in specific sectors;35 b) encouraged judges to make use of it in 
                                                 
32See BIGLIAZZI GERI, BRECCIA, BUSNELLI, NATOLI, Diritto Civile, 
vol.II, Turin, UTET, 1997. MAUGERI, R.M., Le immissioni, Padua, Cedam, 1999. 
For the latest case law see, among others, TAMPIERI, M, “Il danno esistenziale da 
immissioni acustiche nell’universo del danno alla persona”, in Responsabilità civile e 
previdenza, 4-5 (2003): 1209-1217.  
33 See Constitutional Court, decisions n. 122/1970 and n. 88/1979. Case law of 
the Constitutional Court is available, though in Italian only, at the following website: 
www.cortecostituzionale.it.   
34 See Constitutional Court, decisions n.156/1971 and 177/1984. 
35 See Constitutional Court, decision n.333/1991. 
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their gap-filling activity;36 c) removed legislative obstacles hindering the 
applicability of the principle.37  
 
The Corte di Cassazione has also made use of the ‘direct effect 
argument’ on several occasions, fostering a change in the interpretation to be 
given to private law rules and institutions and radically revising sector 
specific disciplines.38  
 
II.1.2 The referendum and the Constitutional Court: from a system of 
checks and balances to the role of actors in law-making process. 
 
As part of a unitary institutional design, a system of checks and 
balances on the parliamentary form of government was provided in the 
constitutional text. Two main constituent types of the system were set up: 
direct democracy instruments (the referendum, at art.75, 138, 123 and 132, 
and the right of citizens to propose a statute at art.71, 2nd par.) and judicial 
control (the organization of judiciary and the Constitutional Court). In my 
discussion of law finding, I will examine here one constituent of each type, 
in order to underscore their implications for the dynamics of the balance 
between sources of law in the realm of law in action. 
 
Ordinary legislation and constitutional laws may be repealed by 
means of a referendum pursuant to art.75 and 138 of the Italian 
Constitution; administrative statutes, regional and local acts can be 
repealed pursuant to art.123 and 132 of the Italian Constitution. Despite 
the obligation to implement a mandatory constitutional provision, the 
enactment of a statute enabling the use of this instrument took place only 
in 1970 (Law n.352). From a political and constitutional standpoint, the 
                                                 
36 See Constitutional Court, decision n.34/1973. 
37 See Constitutional Court, decision n.313/1990. 
38 The Corte di Cassazione is the Italian Supreme Court, which serves as a court 
of last resort for criminal and civil disputes. For a brief description of functions 
performed by Corte di Cassazione, see TARUFFO, M. “Civil procedure and the path 
of a civil case”, in MATTEI, U.,  LENA, J.S.,  (2002) supra fn.7, 159-180, at pp.176-
177. The Corte di Cassazione  applied the argument on the grounds that art.2 Italian 
Constitution , which affords protection to human rights and provides a legal basis for 
the direct effect principle. See Corte di Cassazione, case n.3775/1994. In reference to 
contract law, see case n.10511/1999; in relation to personal injury (the so called 
“danno alla persona”) see cases n.7713/2000, n.8828/2003 and 233/2003. 
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most important type of referendum is that concerning ordinary legislation 
and constitutional laws.39  
 
The Constitutional Court, however, has extended the scope of 
legitimacy control to any situation in which a clash with constitutional 
norms is foreseeable.40 In particular the Court decided to drop referendum 
proposals’ which might create a legislative vacuum in vital sectors of 
democratic life.41 The extent of the legitimacy control is consistent with 
the approach taken by the same Court in the field of constitutionality 
control over national and regional statutes: the doctrine applied is that of 
legislative and institutional continuity. The Constitutional Court in fact has 
repeatedly stated that the repealing effect of constitutional ius 
superveniens, whether promulgated by the Parliament or set forth in the 
Court’s decisions, needed to be interpreted in a flexible manner, as long as 
it concerns matters in which the “organizational layer” is predominant.42 
The doctrine developed by the Constitutional Court clearly indicates that 
                                                 
39 The proposal procedure may be initiated either by five Regional Councils 
or 500.000 voters. The proposal is reviewed by Corte di Cassazione which checks 
procedural legitimacy. Then it is sent to the Constitutional Court for a substantial 
control of compatibility with the limits set in art.75. Not every piece of legislation 
is suitable for legislative intervention by means of a referendum,  since the 
institution is bound both by formal limits and by limits concerning regulated 
matters. Hence, by means of a referendum it is possible to repeal (partially or 
totally) only statutes and government acts provided which have the force of law. 
As regards the limits ratione materia, tax or budget laws, amnesties or pardons as 
well as laws authorizing ratification of international treaties are not subject to 
referendum. 
40 See Constitutional Court, case n. 16/1978. 
41 Two clusters of parameters come into play in the exercise of constitutional 
control over the legitimacy of referendum proposals: one concerning the limits posed 
by art.75 of the Italian Constitution, the other concerning the result of the referendum, 
which must conform to the constitution and be compatible with an efficient legislative 
framework. Ten are the criteria deployed by the Constitutional Court in order to 
evaluate referendum proposals in relation to the afore-mentioned parameters; for an 
analytical description of more than 20 decisions and a tentative reading of the Court’s 
orientation, see MODUGNO, F. “Ancora una rassegna sull’ammissibilità dei 
referendum abrogative vent’anni dopo”, in Giurisprudenza Costituzionale,  3 
(2001):1785-1799. 
42 The doctrine is known as “principio di continuità” and is to be applied in case 
of succession of laws; see Constitutional Court, decisions n.13/1974 and 376/2002. 
The comparison between legitimacy control on referendum and legitimacy control of 
national and regional statutes is made explicit in LUCIANI, M. “L’autonomia 
legislativa”, in Le Regioni, 2/3 (2004):355-380, at p.363.  
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the control of constitutionality tends to have equal scope regardless of the 
type of source of law considered. 
 
Major reforms of Italian private law have been either rejected or 
accomplished by means of referenda, as occurred in the case of the statute 
introducing divorce in family law43 and in the case of the statute regulating 
the right to interrupt a pregnancy that is either undesired or at-risk.44 In the 
past decades, the constant use of the referendum, not only by citizens, but 
also and mainly by interest groups, has clearly shown that it may play the 
role of a ‘functional tool’ in the political arena.45 For this reason some 
constitutional lawyers maintain that the use of referenda has been altering 
the constitutional form of parliamentary government.   
 
As regards the second constituent mentioned above, the setting up of 
a Constitutional Court is regarded as a necessary step toward the 
democratization of a legal system:46 prominent control functions are assigned 
                                                 
43 Divorce was introduced into the framework of Italian family Law in 1970, 
after a long political debate that took place at the levels both of parliament and 
civil society. L.898/1970 was finally enacted, with a majority vote of 33 votes 
only. As a consequence Catholic pressure groups have challenged the statute 
many times proposing referenda aimed at repealing the statute. At last a 
referendum was held in 1974 and 59.3 per cent of voters expressed their will 
(desire / determination)to keep the statute. Later the so-called Fortuna-Baslini Act 
was amended by the Act n. 436/1978 and the Act 74/1987. For a brief introduction 
to Italian family law see FERRANDO, G. “ Famiglia e Matrimonio “ in Familia, , 
4 (2001): 939-965. See also BIANCA, C. M. Diritto Civile, vol.II La Famiglia. Le 
successioni, 4th revised ed., Milan, Giuffrè, 2005. 
44 Law n.194/1978 acknowledged an individual’s right to interrupt a 
pregnancy under strict medical control but only under definite circumstances, 
mainly related to the protection of her physical or mental health and well-being. 
Three referendum proposals have been put forward in order to repeal the statute. 
In 1981 68 per cent of the voters expressed their desire to maintain Law n.194 in 
force.  
45 An analysis of the political dynamics connected with referendum voting is to 
be found in ULERI, P.V. “On referendum voting in Italy: YES, NO or non-vote? How 
Italian Parties learned to control referendum”, in European Journal of political 
research, 41(2002): 863-883; “One peculiarity that sets the Italian referendum 
experience apart from that of most other democracies is that the decision to hold 
referendum generally has been taken not by government or governing parties, but 
rather by non –governing parties or political groups”, at p.868. 
46 See also the conclusions presented by ECONOMIDES, C.  Rule of Law and 
independent courts, CSCE Seminar of Experts on Democratic Institutions, (Oslo, 4-
15 November 1991) in  Appendix II to the General Report. The Works of the 
Conference took place withinin the general framework of the institutional activities 
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to the Constitutional Court, entrusted with the judicial review of legislation 
(art.134-137) and with the jurisdiction on the conflicts of attribution that may 
arise between different institutional powers of the Sate. The Italian system is 
akin to the Austrian model, in which the adjudicative function is reserved to a 
special judge, as opposed to the North American model, in which the 
adjudication competence is spread throughout the judicial system.47  
 
However, the bare model of the Constitutional Court’s functions and 
capacities does not account for the real scope of its activities in the legal 
                                                                                                                    
held by the Venice Commission, Council of Europe. The functions of the 
Constitutional Courts are expressly linked to the ‘rule of law’ principle and are 
described as being functional to the preservation of  democratic dynamics between 
institutional powers: “……[…] 4.It is consequently imperative that the jurisdictional 
power shall be independent of the other two State functions -legislative and executive - if 
it is to be able to carry out its mission freely, objectively, impartially and effectively, in 
the common interest. We can go so far as to say that this independence is the prime 
condition for the rule of law. It is guaranteed in fact first by a set of functional 
guarantees, then by a set of personal guarantees for magistrates, and lastly by means of 
guarantees which for the most part are inherent in jurisdictional proceedings. A. 
Functional guarantees The jurisdictional function is exercised by courts established by 
the law, made up of independent magistrates. Their mission is to settle on the basis of the 
law, and in accordance with organized judicial proceedings, any question coming within 
their sphere, by means of decisions which are binding on the parties .The functional 
independence of the courts is ensured vis-à-vis the other two State powers as follows: a. 
Vis-à-vis the legislative power 1. Whenever the courts are confronted with legislative 
enactments whose contents are contrary to the constitution, they must either, depending 
on circumstances, set in motion through the intermediary of the competent organ the 
procedure for the jurisdictional verification of the constitutionality of those enactments, 
or themselves carry out such verification- if they are empowered to do so - and refuse to 
apply the anti-constitutional laws. Verification of the constitutionality of laws by the 
courts is a fundamental function in a State based on the rule of law.” 
47 The Court exercises its judicial functions by two main procedures of 
adjudication:  a) Ricorso in via principale: the government or the Regions challenge 
the constitutionality of a statute having the force of law, with a view to proving that 
Parliament has illegitimately taken away their normative power; b) Ricorso in via 
incidentale:  either the parties to a case or the judge may question the legitimacy of a 
statute that should be applied in the case. If the judge believes that the legitimacy 
problem is relevant to the case and well-grounded,  the ‘question of constitutionality’ 
is sent to the Court to be examined. 
For a comparative survey on European Constitutional Courts and their 
compositions, see Council of Europe, Venice Commission, Revised Report on the 
Composition of Constitutional Courts, Strasbourg, 3rd of July 1997/CDL-
JU(1997)010, available on http://venice.coe.int/docs/1997/CDL-JU(1997)010rev-
prov-e.asp.  
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system, as already noted when examining referendum voting. In fact, to 
regard the Constitutional Court’s role as that of a mere arbiter of legitimacy 
would be reductive; the Court also plays a pivotal part in steering the political 
process and policymaking.48 In the juridical framework the possible clash 
between institutional functions belonging to the Court and other powers of the 
State is a consequence of the counterbalancing functions assigned to the Court 
which are associated with the different sources of legitimacy for the Court’s 
action. The aggregate effect has been interpreted either as a purely “anti-
majoritarian” device or as an instrument of “deliberative democracy.”49 In 
relation to the internal balance of the Italian legal system it has been noted 
that the Constitutional Court performs a “smoothening-out” function, trying to 
mitigate the effect that its decisions might have on the system as a whole. The 
Court also plays this role in its jurisprudence based on the doctrine of 
“continuity,” as noted earlier.50 Furthermore, a recent reform proposal 
concerning several constitutional provisions, among which also art.135 of the 
Italian Constitution, dealing with the appointment procedure of Constitutional 
judges, strengthened the perception of the Court as a true institutional 
mediator.51 In particular, at art.51 of the Legislative draft52 provides for a 
                                                 
48 An illuminating reading of the role played by the Italian Constitutional Court 
in policy making processes is offered by VOLCANSEK, M, L. “Constitutional 
Courts as veto players: Divorce and decrees in Italy”, European Journal of Political 
Research, 39 (2001): 347-372. The figures prove the assumption: a complete data set 
is contained in ULERI, P.V. (2002) supra fn 45. 
49 The former theory is advocated by Hans Kelsen; the latter by Jürgen 
Habermas. An inventory of the judicial reviews of Constitutional Courts is given and 
analysed in SADURSKI, W. (ed.) Constitutional Justice, East and West. Democratic 
Legitimacy and Constitutional Courts in Post-Communist Europe in a comparative 
perspective, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2002. As regards the Italian 
Constitutional Court, see, ROLLA, G. GROPPI, T. “Between Politics and the Law. 
The development of Constitutional review in Italy”, in SADURSKI, W. (2002):143-
161. See also GROPPI, T. “Verso una giustizia costituzionale’ mite’? Recenti 
tendenze dei rapporti tra Corte Costituzionale e Giudici Comuni.” In Politica del 
Diritto, 2 (2002):217-235.   
50 See GROPPI, T. “Verso una giustizia costituzionale mite?”, (2002)  fn.44, at 
p.225-230. As for the doctrine of continuità, see infra fn. 42. 
51 See FIORILLO, M. “La Corte Costituzionale nella transizione infinita”, in 
Quaderni Costituzionali, 1 (2005):144-147. See also DI COSIMO, G. 
“Delegificazione e tutela giurisdizionale” in Quaderni Costituzionali, 2 (2002): 241-
254.  
52 The Constitutional reform draft, Disegno di Legge Costituzionale n.2544, 
XIV legislatura, is available at www.senato.it [Note the Constitutional draft has 
been approved by Italian Senate on the 16th of November 2005. The text 
however is not yet in force. On the 23th of November the Chancery of the 
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High Court (Suprema Corte di Cassazione) received a referendum proposal, 
pursuant to art.138 Italian Constitution, aimed at repealing the constitutional 
reform. The text of the referendum proposal is published in the Official 
Bulletin of the State, 24th of November 2005]. Art.51 runs as follows: “ 1. 
L’articolo 135 della Costituzione è sostituito dal seguente:    «Art. 135. – La Corte 
costituzionale è composta da quindici giudici. Quattro giudici sono nominati dal 
Presidente della Repubblica; quattro giudici sono nominati dalle supreme 
magistrature ordinaria e amministrative; tre giudici sono nominati dalla Camera 
dei deputati e quattro giudici sono nominati dal Senato federale della Repubblica, 
integrato dai Presidenti delle Giunte delle Regioni e delle Province autonome di 
Trento e di Bolzano. 
    I giudici della Corte costituzionale sono scelti fra i magistrati anche a 
riposo delle giurisdizioni superiori ordinaria ed amministrative, i professori 
ordinari di università in materie giuridiche e gli avvocati dopo venti anni di 
esercizio.  I giudici della Corte costituzionale sono nominati per nove anni, 
decorrenti per ciascuno di essi dal giorno del giuramento,e non possono essere 
nuovamente nominati. 
    Alla scadenza del termine il giudice costituzionale cessa dalla carica e 
dall’esercizio delle funzioni. Nei successivi tre anni non può ricoprire incarichi di 
governo, cariche pubbliche elettive o di nomina governativa o svolgere funzioni in 
organi o enti pubblici individuati dalla legge. 
    La Corte elegge tra i suoi componenti, secondo le norme stabilite dalla 
legge, il Presidente, che rimane in carica per un triennio, ed è rieleggibile, fermi 
in ogni caso i termini di scadenza dall’ufficio di giudice. 
    L’ufficio di giudice della Corte è incompatibile con quello di membro del 
Parlamento, di un Consiglio regionale, con l’esercizio della professione di 
avvocato e con ogni carica ed ufficio indicati dalla legge. 
    Nei giudizi d’accusa contro il Presidente della Repubblica intervengono, oltre i 
giudici ordinari della Corte, sedici membri tratti a sorte da un elenco di cittadini 
aventi i requisiti per l’eleggibilità a deputato, che la Camera dei deputati compila 
ogni nove anni mediante elezione con le stesse modalità stabilite per la nomina 
dei giudici ordinari». 
    2. All’articolo 2 della legge costituzionale 22 novembre 1967, n. 2, le 
parole: «dal Parlamento» sono sostituite dalle seguenti: «dalla Camera dei 
deputati». 
    3. L’articolo 3 della legge costituzionale 22 novembre 1967, n. 2, è 
sostituito dal seguente: 
    «Art. 3. – 1. I giudici della Corte costituzionale nominati dal Senato 
federale della Repubblica e quelli nominati dalla Camera dei deputati sono eletti 
a scrutinio segreto e con la maggioranza dei due terzi dei componenti la rispettiva 
Assemblea. Per gli scrutini successivi al terzo è sufficiente la maggioranza dei tre 
quinti dei componenti la rispettiva Assemblea». 
As regards the legislative draft n.2544, see also the opinion given by the 
Italian association of Constitituional lawyers at the request of the Senate 
Committee: D’ATENA, A, “Pareri resi richiesti all'AIC dalla prima 
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mechanism of appointment that directly links the composition of the 
Constitutional Court to the balances of democratic representation in the 
Parliament and in the new Federal Senate. In a de iure condito perspective 
and with particular reference to the legitimacy control to be exercised on the 
Government’s regulatory power, the Constitutional Court has been presented 
as the best institution to bring about the mediation between administrative and 
legislative powers.53 
 
From a political viewpoint, the Italian Constitutional Court has been 
judged as a significant example of veto player54, in other words as an 
influential actor (or agent) in the policy-making process. By way of example, 
both interpretations of the action of the Constitutional Court may be traced 
indeed in the history of the aforementioned legislative reforms concerning 
divorce and abortion. Lastly, if one looks at the traditional features of the 
legal system, the study of the contribution made by Constitutional Court to the 
development of sector-specific disciplines is undisputed, as will clearly 
emerge when the role of judiciary in rule making is examined.  
 
1.3 The law-making process: the legislator(s)  
 
Law-making power has always had a crucial importance in 
representing the ordering design of the State: consequently, in a hierarchical 
paradigm of sources of law, prominence had to be assigned to legislation 
enacted by Parliament, as the supreme manifestation of State’s will and a 
                                                                                                                    
Commissione del Senato della Repubblica in merito al disegno di legge di riforma 
costituzionale AS 2544”, available at: 
http://www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it/materiali/speciali/pareri2544/datena.
html . 
53 See DI COSIMO, G. (2002) supra fn. 51, at p.251: “..[…] la Corte dovrebbe 
applicare la Costituzione in funzione di limite esterno all’azione normativa del 
regolamento…[omissis] . La condizione principale per attivare il libero scambio fra 
giurisdizione amministrativa e giurisdizione costituzionale si ricollega all’idea che 
l’istituzione della Corte serva a tutelare interessi lesi da atti che nel precedente 
ordinamento sfuggivano a qualsiasi controllo in quanto espressione di potere 
politico”. 
54 See VOLCANSEK, M. L. (2001) supra fn.48, at p.347-351 for the definition 
of “veto player” : “constitutions enumerate the rules for what the executive and 
parliament can or cannot do, but’someone is required to keep an eye on them’, and 
that is how courts enter the political space. Where courts with the power to review 
legislation exist to monitor the rules, the bargaining becomes three-way”, at p.352. 
As for the portrait of the staple features of the Italian system, see ibidem, at pp.364-
367. The role of the Constitutional Court is also examined in relation to the major 
phenomena of the “presidentialization of parliamentary regimes”. 
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symbol of the unitary processes of representative democracy. The Italian legal 
system is no exception to this generalized way of representing the State, but in 
the past decades the situation has changed considerably to the extent that at 
present the Constitution may also be defined as a negotiated set-up of 
balances between the institutional powers to assign portions of sovereignty: 
moreover, the functions performed by state laws now extend to the different 
aim of presiding those negotiated balances. In other words, the fragmentation 
of the normative unity of the State has transformed what used to be a static 
picture of so-called “normative pluralism” under the umbrella of state law 
into a process of integration and cooperation, whose limits need to be 
negotiated both with other ‘regulators’ and different groups of regulatees.55 
The main critical phases of this process may be clarified by analysing the way 
in which law-making powered has shifted from Parliament to other 
institutional bodies. 
 
The original design, which goes back to a liberal conception of the 
State is outlined in the Constitution at art.70, according to which the 
legislative function originally rests mainly with Parliament. The system can 
be characterised as monistic, since the executive power and the Regions can 
enact statutory law (laws having the force of primary legislation) only within 
pre-determined limits and under the “supervision” of Parliament.56 Only 
delegated legislation and urgent decrees, art.76 (decreti legislativi) and 77 
(decreti legge) can be enacted by the Executive Power. These statutes have 
the force of law but their binding force of law is subject to limited conditions 
                                                 
55 This opinion is fleshed out in a synthetic paper by MANFRELLOTTI, R. 
“Esercizio di funzioni mormative e partecipazione dei soggetti privati: a proposito dei 
regolamenti della società di gestione della borsa”, in  Rivista Italiana di diritto 
pubblico e comunitario,5 (2000):1007-1021. See also the references to a vast 
literature concerning the transformation of the State, its impact on the balance 
between institutional powers and the system of sources of law, fns. N19-27. 
56 Legislative procedure is set forth in art.70-74 and can be divided in four stages, 
as follows. Legislative procedure begins with a proposal of a legislative draft: this can 
be proposed either by single deputies or senators, by the Government or by 500.000 
citizens. After a parliamentary session in which the draft is discussed and if necessary 
amended, the approval of both chambers is needed. Once the draft law is passed by 
Parliament, a further step required for the law to be enacted is its promulgation by the 
President of the Republic, who may send the law back to the Chambers if a clash with 
constitutional provisions is expected from the implementation of the act. However, 
the President’s denial of the promulgation may be overturned by a second vote of  
both Chambers with a simple majority. The final phase of legislative procedure 
consists in the publication in the Official Bulletin of the State: then the act is ready to 
come into force automatically in 30 days after the publication, unless expressly 
provided for otherwise. 
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and granted upon exceptional circumstances; they need either ex ante 
authorization or ex post ratification by Parliament within sixty days from their 
promulgation. 
 
The shift from a monistic to a dual model has occurred because of a 
constant increase in the use of both legislative tools by the Government over 
the past decades. The causes underlying the transformation of the model are 
mainly political ones: by enacting a decreto legge the Government avoids the 
risk of presenting the draft bill to Parliament. Until the Constitutional Court’s 
decision n.360/1996, the Government’s practice was to re-enact the decree at 
the expiry date, thus prolonging its validity ad libitum. The Constitutional 
Court finally put an end to this practice on the grounds of its constitutional 
illegitimacy. At present the executive power is granted more room to 
manoeuvre by means of decreti legislativi. Important reforms, such as the 
reform of the taxation system, have in fact been enacted by means of these 
acts. 
 
The model for the allocation of legislative power was already latent in 
the system, that is, it needed to be found in the balance, supposedly reached 
from time to time, between the Parliament and Executive power. However, 
this phase came to an end with the enactment of Law n.1/1999 and 
Constitutional law n.3/2001, a constitutional reform which re-allocated 
legislative spheres of competence between the State and the regional level.  
 
In the previous formulation of art.117 Italian Constitution, seventeen 
different subject matters were listed. The Regions might then enact regional 
statutory laws concerning these matters, within the limits of the fundamental 
principles set out in national laws. Regional statutes, moreover, were to 
undergo a control of legitimacy to be carried out by the national government. 
Art.118 stated that Regions with ordinary Statute held executive power in the 
same fields as those listed in art.117, but the national government could also 
delegate further administrative competences to the regions. 
 
Constitutional law n. 3/2001 radically changed this scenario; it now 
lists: a) seventeen fields in which the State has exclusive legislative 
competence; b) eighteen fields in which State and Regions have concurrent 
competence. All other matters are subject to regional competence.57 
                                                 
57 Art 117 Italian constitution lays down as follows: “La potestà legislativa è 
esercitata dallo Stato e dalle Regioni nel rispetto della Costituzione, nonché dei 
vincoli derivanti dall'ordinamento comunitario e dagli obblighi internazionali.  
Lo Stato ha legislazione esclusiva nelle seguenti materie:  
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a) politica estera e rapporti internazionali dello Stato; rapporti dello Stato con 
l'Unione europea; diritto di asilo e condizione giuridica dei cittadini di Stati non 
appartenenti all'Unione europea; 
b) immigrazione; 
c) rapporti tra la Repubblica e le confessioni religiose; 
d) difesa e Forze armate; sicurezza dello Stato; armi, munizioni ed esplosivi; 
e) moneta, tutela del risparmio e mercati finanziari; tutela della concorrenza; 
sistema valutario; sistema tributario e contabile dello Stato; perequazione delle 
risorse finanziarie; 
f) organi dello Stato e relative leggi elettorali; referendum statali; elezione del 
Parlamento europeo; 
g) ordinamento e organizzazione amministrativa dello Stato e degli enti pubblici 
nazionali; 
h) ordine pubblico e sicurezza, ad esclusione della polizia amministrativa locale; 
i) cittadinanza, stato civile e anagrafi; 
l) giurisdizione e norme processuali; ordinamento civile e penale; giustizia 
amministrativa; 
m) determinazione dei livelli essenziali delle prestazioni concernenti i diritti 
civili e sociali che devono essere garantiti su tutto il territorio nazionale; 
n) norme generali sull'istruzione; 
o) previdenza sociale; 
p) legislazione elettorale, organi di governo e funzioni fondamentali di Comuni, 
Province e Città metropolitane; 
q) dogane, protezione dei confini nazionali e profilassi internazionale; 
r) pesi, misure e determinazione del tempo; coordinamento informativo statistico 
e informatico dei dati dell'amministrazione statale, regionale e locale; opere 
dell'ingegno; 
s) tutela dell'ambiente, dell'ecosistema e dei beni culturali. 
Sono materie di legislazione concorrente quelle relative a: rapporti 
internazionali e con l'Unione europea delle Regioni; commercio con l'estero; tutela e 
sicurezza del lavoro; istruzione, salva l'autonomia delle istituzioni scolastiche e con 
esclusione della istruzione e della formazione professionale; professioni; ricerca 
scientifica e tecnologica e sostegno all'innovazione per i settori produttivi; tutela 
della salute; alimentazione; ordinamento sportivo; protezione civile; governo del 
territorio; porti e aeroporti civili; grandi reti di trasporto e di navigazione; 
ordinamento della comunicazione; produzione, trasporto e distribuzione nazionale 
dell'energia; previdenza complementare e integrativa; armonizzazione dei bilanci 
pubblici e coordinamento della finanza pubblica e del sistema tributario; 
valorizzazione dei beni culturali e ambientali e promozione e organizzazione di 
attività culturali; casse di risparmio, casse rurali, aziende di credito a carattere 
regionale; enti di credito fondiario e agrario a carattere regionale. Nelle materie di 
legislazione concorrente spetta alle Regioni la potestà legislativa, salvo che per la 
determinazione dei principi fondamentali, riservata alla legislazione dello Stato.  
Spetta alle Regioni la potestà legislativa in riferimento ad ogni materia non 
espressamente riservata alla legislazione dello Stato. 
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“Concurrent competence” means that in these matters a Region can 
enact pieces of legislation abiding by the fundamental principles set by 
national primary regulation. On the basis of this, some commentators have 
observed that the reform has fostered a re-allocation of legislative power 
between national and regional institutions rather than a simple distribution of 
competences for the enactment of pre-determined sources of law.58 As 
examples of pivotal subject matters attracted in the sphere of concurrent 
regional legislative powers, one could mention health protection and scientific 
research.59 Where a subject matter is not expressly included in the State 
competence, the power to regulate it rests with the Regions; nonetheless the 
Constitutional Court has adopted a softening approach in implementing the 
reform, by the use of a broad interpretation of the range of regulatory powers 
                                                                                                                    
Le Regioni e le Province autonome di Trento e di Bolzano, nelle materie di loro 
competenza, partecipano alle decisioni dirette alla formazione degli atti normativi 
comunitari e provvedono all'attuazione e all'esecuzione degli accordi internazionali e 
degli atti dell'Unione europea, nel rispetto delle norme di procedura stabilite da 
legge dello Stato, che disciplina le modalità di esercizio del potere sostitutivo in caso 
di inadempienza. 
La potestà regolamentare spetta allo Stato nelle materie di legislazione 
esclusiva, salva delega alle Regioni. La potestà regolamentare spetta alle Regioni in 
ogni altra materia. I Comuni, le Province e le Città metropolitane hanno potestà 
regolamentare in ordine alla disciplina dell'organizzazione e dello svolgimento delle 
funzioni loro attribuite. 
Le leggi regionali rimuovono ogni ostacolo che impedisce la piena parità degli 
uomini e delle donne nella vita sociale, culturale ed economica e promuovono la 
parità di accesso tra donne e uomini alle cariche elettive. 
La legge regionale ratifica le intese della Regione con altre Regioni per il 
migliore esercizio delle proprie funzioni, anche con individuazione di organi comuni. 
Nelle materie di sua competenza la Regione può concludere accordi con Stati e 
intese con enti territoriali interni ad altro Stato, nei casi e con le forme disciplinati da 
leggi dello Stato.  
58 See PIZZETTI, F., (2003) supra fn.31, at p.601: “ i vincoli ed i limiti indicati 
dalla nuova norma costituzionale si rivolgono infatti esplicitamente alla potestà 
legislativa e non alla fonte legge, e men che mai alla legge statale o a quella 
regionale considerate nella loro specificità di fonti normative individuate, tipizzate e 
distinte.” 
59 Foreseeable problems of implementation are connected with the promulgation 
of concurrent legislation in matters where State framework legislation is still – 
illegitimately- lacking; see, as a an example of how to detect possible consequences in 
the area of health protection and clinical trials on drugs: DEL NEVO, A. 
“Sperimentazione clinica”, in CENDON, P (ed.), I nuovi contratti nella prassi civile e 
commerciale, vol.III, T.1 Persone e Famiglia., Turin, Utet, 2004, pp.3-55, at p.8-15. 
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in “diagonal” matters granted to the State pursuant to the second paragraph of 
art.117.60 
 
The reform is an attempt to introduce the subsidiarity principle in the 
Italian legal system, though choosing a path alternative to that of the German 
model: in fact, art.74 German Constitution states that the Länder can legislate 
in the fields listed in art.74 as long as the Bund does not take the competence 
upon itself (Subsidiaritè à l’allemande). Both the aforementioned 
constitutional law and the new formulation of ar.114 set up a complex 
institutional design which aims at emphasizing regional and local legislative 
responses to regulatory needs. Accordingly, ex ante State control on regional 
legislation has been repealed in constitutional law n.3/2001; at the same time 
the revised text of art.118 provides for the application of subsidiarity principle 
to administrative spheres of competences, which now rest with Municipalities 
(comuni), if it is not necessary for the Regions or the State to exert them. The 
implementation of Constitutional Law n.3/2001 has to be conceived as a 
process, since the exact definitions of legislative and regulatory spheres of 
competences and their balance with administrative powers must still be tested 
on a daily basis; the increasing number of decisions rendered by the 
Constitutional Court in its struggle to define clear-cut confines for each 
competence shows that only in time will it be possible to assess the proper 
functioning of the new allocation of legislative power.61  
 
This shift has had various seminal consequences at many levels. For 
our present purpose, it must first be noted that the legislative and the 
regulatory competence of the Regions are now more penetrating, from both a 
quantitative and a qualitative standpoint. In practical terms, the enhancement 
                                                 
60 See Constitutional Court, decision n.303/2003. In the same decision the Court 
also clarified that the principle underpinning the reform is that of subsidiarity, thus 
rejecting the academic querelle on the differentiation of principles governing 
legislative and administrative functions in the design of the devolution system. But 
for an academic assessment of this provision as a suitable means to avoid excessive 
internal regulatory differentiation and the subsequent discontinuities, see PIZZETTI, 
F., (2003) supra fn. 31 at p.609. See also CARETTI, P. “La Corte e la tutela delle 
esigenze unitarie: dall’interesse nazionale al principio di sussidiarietà”, in Le 
Regioni, 2-3 (2004):381-389.   
61 See for instance Constitutional Court, decision n.303/2003 , where the Court 
advocates the need to foster  a systematic interpretation of the Constitutional text, 
with express reference to art.117 and 118. In 2004 alone, the Court gave 18 decisions 
concerning art.117, 11 of which concerned the amended text of the provision. In 
particular see decision n.6/2004, where the systematic interpretation argument is 
deployed to attract subject matters in the sphere of State competence. 
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of legislative spheres of competences also carries along with it an 
enhancement of regulatory and administrative functions, pursuant to art. 114 
and art.118 of the Italian Constitution, though within the limits set in art.120 
of the Italian Constitution. A second effect of the reform might be to upgrade 
the role of the judiciary in the task of tailoring the system: apart from the 
tailoring function performed by the Constitutional Court, which I touched 
upon describing the outline of the reform, the judiciary might be able to 
perform a control function on the coherence of the system, the Corte di 
Cassazione granting at the same time an appropriate level of uniformity in the 
interpretation of framework rules and general principles. 
 
The goals of this reform that affects the core of legislative functions 
must be evaluated in terms of simplification, legitimacy and accountability. 
The first criterion remains unsatisfied, since the definition of the scope of the 
competence and the extent of the subject matters has still to be reached by the 
Constitutional Court in its capacity of mediator between institutional 
powers.62 Moreover, the uncertainty created by the reform has jeopardized the 
attainment of any improvement in the legitimacy of the legislation produced 
and in the accountability of regulators towards civil society, since the very 
rules governing the process are still unclear. 
 
Nevertheless, it would be unfair to draw the line at this transitional 
phase; constitutional law n.3/2001 paved the way for developing an internal 
“multilevel governance”. In this perspective the staple dialogue between the 
Constitutional Court and both the Regions and the State legislator will make 
institutional cooperation and coordination a real possibility. 
 
III. Law finding and law shaping 
 
In broad terms, there could be two ways of conceiving the law-
making power of quasi-institutional actors, that is, those groups of actors that 
perform a function in the legal system, which, in theory, would not enable 
them to take part in active law-making. In this paper I will focus my attention 
on two types of quasi-institutional actors: the lawyers and the judges. 
 
In a strong sense, law-making power may be identified mainly in the 
judicial review of legislation, the major implications of which will be, in the 
first place, the full acknowledgement of the influence exerted by the judiciary 
in counterbalancing the legislative and executive powers, i. e. the intervention 
                                                 
62 On this point see the possible related risks for the Constitutional Court in 
CARETTI, P., (2004) supra fn. 60, at p.388. 
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of the judiciary in the political sphere; a second implication will be the 
participation of the judges in the ‘promotional function’ of the law, i.e the 
implementation of public policies by the judges acting in their capacity.63 The 
unveiling of the political layer contained in the judicial review of legislation is 
expressly connected to the development of the Liberal State and the growth of 
welfare functions consequently attributed to the State; moreover, it is claimed 
that, albeit to varying degrees according to the context under scrutiny, the 
reasons underlying this trend can be seen clearly in most contemporary 
democracies.64 
 
In a weaker sense, the law-making power of the judges may be 
identified with the power to set general norms that hold validity in the legal 
system.65 In this case it is also possible to refer to the law-shaping functions 
of the judiciary and indeed the expression emphasizes the results of the 
interpretative activity of the judges, rather than its legitimacy from the 
standpoint of a positivistic theory of the sources of law.66 In continental 
                                                 
63 See FRIEDMAN, M.L. “Is there a Modern Legal Culture?” in Ratio Juris, 7/2 
(1994):117-131. 
64 See CAPPELLETTI, M. “The Law-making power of the judges and its limits”, 
in Monash University Law Review 8 (1981-1982): 15-67, in particular at p.31. See 
also GUARNIERI, C., PEDERZOLI, P. The Power of Judges. A comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001: “The gap between 
the traditional notion of the judicial role and its present political significance is most 
obvious in civil law countries. The declaratory approach has been much more 
persistent in continental Europe, where it is connected to the bureaucratic structure 
of the judiciary”, at p.5. GUARNIERI and PEDERZOLI agree with Cappelletti’s 
main conclusion, that is a renewed emphasis on the promotional function of the Law 
via judicial activity. The authors also maintain that the development of a ‘third giant’ 
is more likely to be a politically sensitive issue in Continental Europe than in the 
USA,  where a more effective system of checks and balances is provided.   
65 The term validity does not here refer to formal requirements conferring force of 
law to the norm. It rather indicates that, despite a given list of formal sources of law, 
these norms deploy their efficacy in the realm of law in action by: a) raising 
spontaneous compliance; b) conforming interpretation; b) fostering similar practices 
by means of suasion and/or  auctoritas. In relation to the law-shaping power of 
judges, for instance, trends of case law and cross referenced decisions are to be taken 
into consideration. 
66 Law-shaping functions can be performed not only by judges but also by other 
classes of jurists such as academics, lawyers or notaries: for an analysis of the law 
making power of notaries, see for instance RICHTER, G-J. “The notarial function in 
making law”, XXIII International Congress of Latin Notaries, Athens, 2001. Papers 
presented by the German delegation are available in English at: 
http://www.bnotk.de/BNotK-Service/Publikationen/UINL-
Berichte/XXIII.kongress/Berichte_EN.htm . Private parties also shape the law when 
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Europe the avowal of the function played by judges in shaping the law was 
brought about by a German movement called “Freirechtsbewegung” at the 
beginning of the Twentieth century; its major proponent, Herman 
Kantorowicz, argued in favour of the law-making power of judges, but only in 
the case of gaps (lacunae legis) in the legal system; therefore, this way of 
conceiving the role of the judges was not revolutionary as regards the 
legislative outcomes of positivism.67 
 
The approach gained new momentum with the crisis of the 
positivistic theory of law; hence challenging currents of investigation have 
started to focus their attention on the problem of interpretation and on the 
scope of the judge’s functions in the legal system, with special reference to 
private law rules.68 The investigation, accomplished with the comparative 
method, has disclosed the creative constituent of interpretation, regardless of 
the class of interpreters involved. These studies have also revealed the 
ideological grounds for those theories of interpretation that consigned the 
autonomy of the judge to restricted areas such as, for instance, that of the 
clarification of the legislator’s intention. Lastly, these findings also show how 
the law-making power of the judges is shaped from time to time, according to 
the dominant conceptions of Law and its authoritative fundamentals. 
However, as earlier mentioned, law-shaping powers are also related to the role 
played by the judiciary’s decisions in the pursuit of public policy objectives. 
The idea is that since the range of public policies pursued by legislative and 
administrative action shows a constant trend in its growth, the judicial 
enforcement of individual rights, whether between individuals, or in disputes 
between individuals and a public body, becomes a crucial instrument for 
“[..]..channelling for the articulation of political demands” as well as for 
meeting individual and collective demands for justice.69 In line with this 
                                                                                                                    
establishing good practices, codes of conduct or standards not formalized in trade 
usages.  
67 See art. 1 Swiss Civil Code 1901: “La loi régit toutes les matières auxquelles 
se rapportent la letter ou l’esprit de l’une de ses dispositions. A défaut d’un 
disposition légale applicable, le juge prononce selon le droit coutoumier, et, à dèfaut 
d’une coutume, selon les règles qu’il établierait s’il avait à faire acte de législateur ». 
See the comparative analysis conducted by GORLA, G. « La giurisprudenza come 
fattore del diritto », in GORLA, G. Diritto Comparato e diritto Comune Europeo, 
Milan, Giuffrè, 1981, pp.263-301. A study of the role of the Italian Courts (Siena and 
Florence) in a historical perspective is also carried out in ASCHERI, M., (1989) supra 
fn. 22. 
68 As regards Italy, see GORLA, G. , (1981) supra fn.67; the essays presented in 
the book however date from the early ‘60s. 
69 See GUARNIERI, C. , PEDERZOLI, P. (2001) supra fn.64, at pp.7-12. 
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approach, it is also necessary to underscore the role played by a different type 
of interpreter – the lawyers – in law shaping. 
 
III.1.1 The Judiciary 
 
In this sub-section I will briefly present some of the characteristics of 
the Italian judiciary: in this regard, it has to be borne in mind that crucial roles 
are played not only by the legal framework in which the machinery of justice 
is bound to operate, but also by the vast array of factors that influence the 
execution of justice. The multi-layered organizational and legal hallmarks of 
the judiciary must both be considered when analysing the judicial power as a 
formant of law in action, as well as when assessing the interaction between 
the political sphere and the judiciary; for the purposes of this paper, only the 
latter layer will be taken into account, since my aim is to describe the way in 
which the judiciary plays a role in shaping legal rules, rather than the possible 
paths of cooperation or confrontation between the judiciary and the political 
actors.70The Italian Constitution provides the framework rules for the lawful 
exercise of power by the judiciary at art.101-113.71 Most of the organizational 
aspects of the judicial system are covered by a “riserva di legge,” thus 
implying that they have to be regulated by acts having the binding force of 
law (art.102, 1st par. and art.108, 1st par.). A similar principle dominates the 
                                                 
70 Useful representations of the judiciary by means of flowcharts are contained in 
PASCUZZI, G. “How to find the law”, in MATTEI,U., LENA, J.S. (eds), (2002) 
supra fn.7, pp.455-472, at 457; GUARNERI, C., PEDERZOLI, P., (2001) supra 
fn.64, at p.91. Analytical description, although not updated, is to be found in 
WATKIN, T.G., (1997) supra fn. 12, at pp.96-157. A complete outline of the system 
is offered by Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura (the independent governing 
body of the judiciary) at:  
http://www.csm.it/documenti%20pdf/sistema%20giudiziario%20italiano/italiano.
pdf . Acts, Statutes and regulations concerning the Judiciary, together with a brief 
description of the Courts system can be found on the of the Ministry of Justice 
website: http://www.giustizia.it . 
71 The basic principles there established deal with the constitution of the 
fundamental conditions for the judiciary to both exercise its control functions and 
ensure the impartiality of the performance of ordinary judicial activity: the 
organizational and functional independence of the judiciary (art.104), the subjection 
of the judge to the law and to the law only (art.101) and the status of the judiciary as 
an independent power. The fundamental principles concerning the appointment of 
magistrates of higher jurisdictions are also provided in the Constitution, though 
detailed provisions are to be found in ordinary acts. 
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direct participation of citizens in the administration of justice, which is 
restricted to particular proceedings related to criminal justice.72 
 
The judiciary is a unitary organization, whose set-up, historically, has 
been influenced by French judicial organization. Its pyramidal structure is 
hierarchically organized and falls within the sphere of the Public 
Administration, though a high degree of independence is granted pursuant to 
the constitutional framework rules already mentioned. Functional and 
organizational independence is related to the performance of strictly 
professional tasks, whilst the hierarchical dimensions of the judicial status 
come into play in connection with career evaluation, role assignments and the 
disciplinary and/or liability rules to be applied. It has been clearly 
acknowledged that “this type of model creates an almost inevitable strain 
between the autonomy judges must necessarily be granted to perform their 
judicial functions and the hierarchical control over their performance.”73 The 
latent threat of institutional clashes between the Ministry of Justice and the 
body of governance of the judiciary (Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura) 
is not only an abstract implication: conflicts arise with a certain regularity; a 
conflict may also arise between the branch of executive power and a single 
magistrate in dealing with the exercise of criminal action in ordinary cases.74 
In several decisions the Constitutional Court has pointed out the importance 
of procedural models of cooperation, already present in the constitutional 
provisions and thoroughly specified in sector-specific legislation; with a view 
to offering guidelines to prevent and solve the conflicts of power between the 
                                                 
72 For a general description of the role played by lay judges in criminal 
proceedings, see WATKIN, T.G.,(1997) supra fn. 12, at p.128-137. 
73 See GUARNIERI, C. , PEDERZOLI, P. (2001) supra fn.64, at p.50.  
74 Not every single magistrate is entitled to raise the conflict of attribution in the 
Constitutional Court: in the case in point the conflict was raised by a pubblico 
ministero. In the Italian system of Criminal procedural Law a public prosecutor 
(pubblico ministero) is entrusted with the investigation about crimes and the 
prosecution of the responsible. This magistrate cannot select crimes to be 
investigated; he is bound by the duty to investigate and prosecute all the crimes that 
are notified to him either by private individuals or by the Police. For this reason the 
impartiality and independence of public prosecutors are sentive issues in the 
organization of judiciary. See for instance Constitutional Court, decision n.420/1995 
and decision n.497/2000, in which the Governing body of the judiciary raised the 
problem of the constitutionality of the provisions that did not grant the magistrate the 
right to receive professional defence in the course of disciplinary proceedings. See 
also Constitutional Court, decision n. 270/2002, annotated by LOY, F. in Giustizia 
Civile, 11 (2002):2719-2723; GIACOBBE, G., “Autonomia della magistratura, 
indipendenza del giudice, poteri del ministro di grazia e giustizia”, in Giustizia civile, 
5 (1999):233-237.  
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judiciary and the Ministry of Justice, the Court ruled that both branches of 
independent powers are bound by a duty of loyal cooperation.75 To sum up, 
the Italian model is that of a bureaucratic judiciary, as opposed to the 
Common law model of professional judiciaries. As is also apparent from this 
brief account of possible confrontations between the executive power and the 
judiciary, guarantees of independence in this model tend to be weak, therefore 
the control function to be performed by the Constitutional Court turns out to 
be crucial in preserving standards of legitimacy and transparency in the action 
of both the judiciary and the executive, whether in their mutual relationships 
or in relation to the protection of individual rights. The dynamics of these 
relationships are also reflected in the recent amendments of Law n.195/1958 
concerning the disciplinary section of the Consiglio Superiore della 
Magistratura.76  
 
For this reason, the draft proposal put forward by the Government 
with a view to amending the Statute, which regulates the set-up of the 
judiciary, gave rise to a highly confrontational debate in which the tension 
between the goals and risks of both bureaucratic and professional models 
became evident.77  Moreover, the constitutional design that would emerge 
                                                 
75 See Constitutional Court, decision n.379/1992. The decision concerned the 
refusal of the Minister of Justice to proceed to the approval of  the designation of a 
magistrate to a directive assignment. The governing body of the Judiciary raised the 
conflict of attribution among powers and asked the Court to take a deliberation on the 
legitimacy of the Minister’s refusal. The key point of the decision is the focus on a 
procedural cooperation model for shaping the relationship between the Ministry of 
Justice and the judiciary.  See also Constitutional Court, decision n.380/2003. 
76 The reform is contained in Law n.44/2002, which reduced the number of 
members sitting in Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura and changed the 
composition of the disciplinary section. 
77 See Draft Law n. 1296-B/bis, approved by the Italian Senate on the21st of 
January 2004. At art 1 of the draft proposal the scope of the reform is provided as 
follows: “Art. 1. (Contenuto della delega)  1. Il Governo è delegato ad adottare, 
entro un anno dalla data di entrata in vigore della presente legge, con 
l’osservanza dei princìpi e dei criteri direttivi di cui all’articolo 2, commi 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, 6, 7 e 8, uno o più decreti legislativi diretti  a: 
        a) modificare la disciplina per l’accesso in magistratura, nonché la 
disciplina della progressione economica e delle funzioni dei magistrati, e 
individuare le competenze dei dirigenti amministrativi degli uffici giudiziari; 
        b) istituire la Scuola superiore della magistratura, razionalizzare la 
normativa in tema di tirocinio e formazione degli uditori giudiziari, nonché in 
tema di aggiornamento professionale e formazione dei magistrati; 
        c) disciplinare la composizione, le competenze e la durata in carica dei 
310 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LEGAL INFORMATION [Vol. 34.2 
 
 
from the systematic implementation of Draft Law n.2544-D78 and Draft Law 
n.1296- B/bis is likely to strengthen both the legislative and the control 
powers of the Executive, resulting in a weakening of parliamentary and 
judiciary prerogatives.  
 
We have described the raise of the “third giant,” its commitment to 
the implementation of public policies and, consequently, the confrontation 
with the other institutional powers. These phenomena are likely to act not 
only upon the efficiency of the judiciary’s organization per se, but also upon 
the efficiency of the judiciary’s responses to the individual/collective 
demands for justice. Furthermore, individuals and the economic actors have 
progressively extended the range of their expectations from the judiciary: 
along with fair and just decisions, private parties now demand a reasonable 
length for the proceedings, flexibility in the procedures, a display of adequate 
instruments to ensure the enforcement of the judgments, and a reduction of 
the unpredictability of the results. Hence, it is likely that non-institutional 
subjects, or rather subjects other than the judiciary, will take part in the 
administration of justice, since this represents not only the possibility of  
providing fair solutions for conflicts from a juridical standpoint, but also an 
acceptable degree of adjustment to changing societal needs. 
                                                                                                                    
consigli giudiziari, nonché istituire il Consiglio direttivo della Corte di 
cassazione;  
 d) riorganizzare l’ufficio del pubblico ministero;  
e) modificare l’organico della Corte di cassazione e la disciplina relativa ai 
magistrati applicati presso la medesima; 
        f) individuare le fattispecie tipiche di illecito disciplinare dei magistrati, le 
relative sanzioni e la procedura per la loro applicazione, nonché modificare la 
disciplina in tema di incompatibilità, dispensa dal servizio e trasferimento 
d’ufficio; 
g)  prevedere forme di pubblicità degli incarichi extragiudiziari conferiti ai 
magistrati di ogni ordine e grado.” 
 For an earlier assessment of the difficulties that might arise from the change of 
status of judges and public prosecutors in the context of Criminal proceedings, see, in 
a comparative perspective, AMODIO, E., “The Accusatorial System Lost and 
Regained: Reforming Criminal Procedure in Italy”, in American Journal of 
Comparative Law 52 (2004) :489-500 
78 See supra fn. 52. The reform touches upon the whole structure of 
representative institutions: it changes the composition, structure and functions of both 
the Parliament and the Senate; the role and powers of the President of the Republic 
and the Prime Minister. More than 60 constitutional lawyers have expressed concerns 
about the future of the constitutional design and democratic guarantees in connection 
with the weakening of the separation of powers. Comments and critiques are available 
at www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it and at www.astrid-online.it . 
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Private bodies and individuals play a minor role in the administration 
of justice, as earlier noted. Two core areas come into play in this regard: a) the 
role of lawyers in the administration of justice; b) the tools offered to the 
parties as an alternative means of resolving disputes. Both areas are related to 
law finding as they represent two of the connecting points between 
institutional and non-institutional lawmaking; in fact, they tie in with the 
process of rule production by both institutions and private actors, that is, the 
phenomena of the so-called formazione negoziale del diritto. 
 
Lawyers are pivotal actors in the so-called “national litigation 
market.”79 Social sciences have brought to the surface the relevance of their 
role in the machinery of justice and in the dynamics of law: from a 
quantitative standpoint “lawyers monitored decisions of the Court. On the 
basis of that monitoring they made thousands of individual decisions about 
when and under what circumstances to sue.”80 From a qualitative standpoint, 
a mutual influence between Courts and lawyers must be highlighted as well as 
an active cooperation in balancing the concurring phenomena of both the so-
called “path dependence” of the judiciary and the adjustment of legal rules to 
changing regulatory needs.81 In fact, it may be observed that lawyers perform 
a role in law shaping, in their capacity of quasi-institutional actors in the 
administration of justice. Hence, it is necessary to spell out the nature of the 
interests pursued by lawyers when selecting the cases and the arguments to be 
brought to Court, since this is the most prominent way in which lawyers 
contribute to the law shaping of the system. Furthermore, the virtuous 
relationship between lawyers in their capacity as advisors, the realm of legal 
                                                 
79 See RUBIN, P. “Why is the Common Law efficient?”, in Journal of legal 
studies, 6 (1977), 1:51-63. 
80 See SHAPIRO, M. , STONE SWEET, A. On Law, Politics, and 
Judicialization, Oxford, Oxford University Press,  2002, at p.96. 
81 See SHAPIRO, M., STONE SWEET, A. (2002) supra fn.80, at p.98. The path 
dependence of the judiciary is defined by STONE SWEET as follows: “Legal 
institutions are path dependent to the extent that how litigation and judicial rule-
making proceeds, in any given area of the law at any given point in time, is 
fundamentally conditioned by how earlier legal disputes in that area of law have been 
sequenced and resolved”. See STONE SWEET, A. “Path Dependence, Precedent 
and Judicial Power”, in SHAPIRO, M. , STONE SWEET, A., (2002) supra fn.80, at 
p.113. On this issue I assume that path dependence and the adjustment of the law to 
the emerging regulatory needs are complementary phenomena; in doing so, I exclude 
a radical opposition between the two. This view is supported by the consideration of 
the cooperative relationship between institutional and quasi-institutional actors in law 
shaping. 
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research and judges contributes to law shaping, in that it fosters innovative 
practices, which may subsequently be systematised by the doctrinal formant 
and definitively accepted by courts and/or restated in statutory legislation.   
 
III.1.2 The role of lawyers 
 
First of all, lawyers are a necessary constituent of the system, because 
when having recourse to the Court in order to obtain the enforcement of their 
rights, citizens must have a technical defense; since all individuals are subject 
to this obligation, the State, pursuant to art.24 of the Italian Constitution, 
provides for the payment of a lawyer for those who cannot afford his 
service.82 Therefore, lawyers are the hinges connecting the administration of 
Justice to the citizens: they act as mediators between the public interest, in its 
broader meaning, and the factual interests brought by the parties to the 
attention of the Courts. This particular quality of the activity of lawyers may 
be indicative of the duality of interests underpinning their function; it is also 
reflected in the duality of legal sources that regulate the legal profession, that 
is, state regulation and self-regulation provided and enforced by the National 
Bar Association. Moreover, this system of mixed substantive regulation 
coupled with an independent enforcement specifies their role in terms of 
quasi-institutional actors taking part in the law-shaping activity.  
 
The public layer of the lawyers’ activities, or at least some of its 
implications, are currently underrated, due to both the quality of State 
regulation concerning the legal profession and the outcome of the interaction 
between the state regulation and the self regulatory instruments provided by 
the Bar Association.83 The discipline of the legal profession consists of 
several statutes which are relevant to the set-up of the Judiciary.84 This legal 
                                                 
82 THE OBLIGATION TO APPEAR IN COURT ASSISTED BY A PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 
IS SET AT ART. 82 CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. THE REAL POSSIBILITY OF BEING 
ASSISTED BY PROFESSIONAL LAWYERS IS GRANTED DIRECTLY BY THE STATE TO 
CITIZENS WHOSE ANNUAL INCOME IS PROVED TO BE LOWER THAN EURO 9.296,22 AND 
IS REGULATED BY ART.74-141 (“PATROCINIO A SPESE DELLO STATO”) OF T.U.  
N.115/2002 REGARDING LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS AND REGULATIONS CONCERNING 
THE COSTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. 
83 See D’ANGELO, A. “La deontologia dell’avvocato” in ZATTI, P. “Le fonti di 
autodisciplina. Tutela del consumatore, del risparmiatore, dell’utente”, Padua, 
Cedam, 1996, pp.12-161 
84 The basic discipline is to be found in Regio Decreto Legislativo, n.1578, 22nd 
of November 1933 and subsequent amendments (henceforth RDL n.1578/1933); 
important modifications and updating are contained in D.Lgs. n.96, 2nd of February 
2001 which, at art. 4 and 5, also provides for the applicability of this legal regime to 
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framework contains provisions which emphasize the relevance of the lawyers’ 
commitment to the public interest. Lawyers and practitioner lawyers must 
swear a formal oath after their registration at the Bar: thus they undertake to 
comply with the duties relating to the legal profession and to the tasks that the 
law assigns to them “in the interest of Justice.”85 Furthermore, they are subject 
to restrictions concerning their place of residence and their personal 
behaviour.86 Both the Bar examination and lawyers’ activities are subject to 
the control of the Ministry of Justice, pursuant to art.36 and 15 RDL n. 
1578/1933; lastly, the table of fees to be charged for legal services is subject 
to the approval of the Ministry of Justice.87 Despite these provisions, members 
of the Bar retain a wide range of independence, since they establish a code of 
conduct that provides for the basic rules to be applied to lawyers in the 
exercise of their dual activity of technical defendants and legal advisors. The 
public interest layer of the legal profession is, however, expressed in both 
sources of provisions by appealing to vague, indefinite and prudential 
concepts, such as “loyalty” or “honor.”88 Thus, the specification of the scope 
of the provisions must be found in disciplinary case law: but, as previously 
mentioned, the system of disciplinary sanctions in the legal profession is 
                                                                                                                    
lawyers who have obtained an equivalent professional qualification in a EU member 
State; D.P.R. n.115, 30th of May 2005. 
85 See art.8, 3rd par.  and art.12, RDL n.1578/1933. 
86 See art. 10, 12, 1st par., art.17, 1st par. N.3, RDL n.1578/1933 as well as the 
limits contained in the Code of Conduct enacted by the National Bar association in 
1997, Codice di deontologia professionale. 
87 See art. 57, 2nd par. RDL n.1578/1933. Every two years the National Bar 
Association drafts a new table of tariffs and presents it to the Ministry of Justice for 
approval. 
88 The examples of the use of prudential concepts are several. In the Lawyers’ 
Code of Conduct (1997) for instance, see art.5 that runs as follows: “Doveri di 
probità, dignità e decoro. – L’avvocato deve ispirare la propria condotta 
all’osservanza dei doveri di probità, dignità e decoro.” The provision binds the 
lawyer to act in his capacity conforming to the duties of probity, dignity and 
propriety. In the State legislation, see art. 12 R.D.L. 1578/1933: “Gli avvocati 
debbono adempiere al loro ministero con dignità e con decoro, come si conviene 
all’altezza della funzione che sono chiamati ad esercitare nell’amministrazione della 
giustizia (co. 1°); - “... <<Giuro di adempiere i miei doveri professionali con lealtà, 
onore e diligenza per i fini della giustizia e per gli interessi superiori della 
Nazione>> (co. 3°); similar expressions are contained in art. 12, 14 and 38 R.D.L. 
1578/1933, as well as in the Criminal Code, at art.88 and 105, 4th par.  The Code of 
Conduct has been “enacted” in 1997. It has been amended in 2002. The full text is 
published in Foro Italiano., 2003, I, c.244. It is also available at 
http://www.consiglionazionaleforense.it/visualizzazioni/vedi_elenco.php?areanumber
=10 .  
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almost entirely administered by the territorial Councils of the Bar Association 
jointly with the National Bar Association, and the form of publicity given to 
the disciplinary cases is limited.89 Consequently, the attitude of the Courts 
towards the upgrading of the function of lawyers is ambiguous.90   
 
On the contrary, the contents of the private interest layer in the legal 
profession are well defined by the contractual obligations that are undertaken 
by the lawyer in performing advisory tasks and the duties of technical 
defense.91 In this regard, the obligation to follow the client’s indications about 
the course of action to be taken within the proceedings or the obligation to 
take on an ill-chosen lawsuit are but two paradigmatic examples of the client-
oriented behaviour that the lawyer is obliged to keep.92 Lawyers are not bound 
to discourage clients from bringing patently ill-chosen lawsuits, nor can they 
refuse to provide legal aid in that sense; nevertheless the duty of care imposes 
on them the obligation to advises the clients about the juridical definition of 
their position and to give them all relevant information concerning alternative 
means of dispute resolution or on the possible juridical implications of the 
clients’ intentions.93 
 
                                                 
89 See art. 37-48 RDL n. 1578/1933. The scarce availability of detailed case law 
and reports of disciplinary cases is indeed a problem which led to the enactment of 
the Code of Conduct, which also contains some provisions concerning the principled 
behaviour to be kept by the lawyer in his relationships with colleagues, clients, judges 
and alike. As the Corte di Cassazione repeatedly stated, these provisions must be 
interpreted as mere examples, thus implying that behaviours not comprised in the 
Code might be considered as disciplinary infractions: on this point see Corte di 
Cassazione, Sez. Un. Decision n.8225/2002. 
90 The acknowledgement of the nature of the function enacted by lawyers is 
vaguely underpinned in the order given by Constitutional Court, ord. n. 359/1999, 
issues in a conflict of attributions between powers raised by a lawyer. In the same 
decision, the Court does not take a clear stand on the problem, thus leaving unsolved 
two major issues: a) a clear definition of the scope and the nature of the lawyer’s 
function within the system of Justice administration and his legitimisation to raise the 
conflict in  Court. The order of the Court is commented by RESCIGNO, F. and 
CELOTTO, A. in Giurisprudenza Italiana, 2000, at pp.1570-1576.  
91 See D’ANGELO, A. (1996) supra fn.83, at p.147-151. According to the author 
the lawyers’ behaviour is oriented towards the fulfilment of the clients’ interest.   
92 See also BARCA, A. “La responsabilità contrattuale dell’avvocato 
nell’espletamento dell’incaricato ricevuto”, in Nuova Giurisprudenza Civile 
Commentata (2001) II, p.483-505. 
93 The problem that may possibly arise from the obligation to pursue the client’s 
interest is that of independence. In point see D’ANGELO, A, (1996) supra fn.83, at p. 
151-155. 
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Hence, the question is how this duality influences the law shaping of 
the legal system. I argue that by performing both technical defense in judicial 
proceedings (litigation) and advisory tasks, lawyers foster (or hinder) virtuous 
developments in the legal system; they select claims to be brought to courts, 
they guarantee the right of judicial enforcement of rights and obligations.94  
 
An example of this kind of law-shaping function exercised by lawyers 
may be seen in the selection of the claims to be brought to the Courts. As 
noted above, lawyers must provide the legal service required by their clients, 
duly disclosing all the relevant information about the legal framework and the 
clients’ position at law; having provided this full information, they may 
suggest that the client take a particular course of action, but ultimately they 
must respect their clients’ determinations and consequently assist them in the 
legal pursuit of their objectives. Hence, lawyers may influence their clients’ 
resolution to bring a lawsuit by placing emphasis on the weakness (or the 
strength) of the clients’ positions at law; they may also suggest that the client 
should make use of means of alternative dispute resolution offered either by 
substantive law or by procedural law. In the former case, the lawyers will 
favour the instruments offered by a specific area of law in order to ensure a 
direct fulfillment of individual rights. A vast array of examples is to be found 
in Italian codified contract law, which enables a debtor or a third party to 
assign real estate revenue to a creditor in security of a debt.95 Other similar 
institutions that aim at the self-enforcement of the party’s rights are provided 
in the case of the breach of a sale contract, due to the buyer’s fault, in which 
the seller has the right to sell the goods by means of an auction.96 In the latter 
case, by selecting the solution which is the most appropriate for the client, 
lawyers will promote alternative instruments of dispute resolution, such as 
arbitration or mediation centres.97 
 
By and large, lawyers also work as mediators between the realm of 
legal research and the realm of the judiciary. From this standpoint, by 
theoretically framing and arguing their pleas, they foster (or undermine) the 
interpretations and systematisations of the law proposed by doctrine; the 
opposite dynamic can also occur, since lawyers put forward the legal grounds 
                                                 
94 On this specific point see D’ANGELO, A. (1996) supra fn.83,  at p.147. 
95 This peculiar type of contract is called “anticresi” and is regulated at art.1960-
1964 Italian Civil Code. 
96 See art. 1515 and 1516, art.1686 and 1687, Italian Civil Code.  See also art. 
1500-1509 Italian Civil Code which constitute the legal basis for the contract of  “sale 
and lease back”. 
97 Mediation Centres have been set up in  Chambers of Commerce, pursuant to 
Law n. 580/1993. 
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to trade practices and determine the scope of the judicial response to the case 
in hand, potentially stimulating a new systematisation of the law and 
promoting the occurrence of revirement in High Court case law.  
 
A picture of the extent to which this virtuous triadic alliance might be 
beneficial to law shaping is offered by a recent development in the field of 
floating charges.98 The traditional systematisation of securities implied that 
the autonomy of the parties was prevented from constituting a floating charge 
in the form of a pledge (“pegno rotativo”); however, the legal formalization of 
trade practices, especially in the sectors of banking and international 
commerce, had already been offering both doctrine and the courts a constant 
application of this contractual scheme as a security in a wide range of 
financial and commercial transactions; in the 1990s, the validity of these legal 
formalizations became accepted doctrine.99 The repeated occurrence of 
claims, regularly dismissed by the courts,100 underscored the fact that legal 
practice had been reluctant to conform to the strict interpretation offered by 
doctrine and by Courts at that time. Finally, the High Court has reached a 
position in which it acknowledges, though via the mediations of the above-
mentioned doctrine, the practice of “pegno rotativo;”101 shortly afterwards the 
legislator expressly provided a norm which contemplates this type of 
security.102 
 
III.2.1 Judge-made law 
                                                 
98 According to art. 2784 of the Italian Civil Code, securities consisting of cash 
collaterals or movable goods are attached to the goods, so that the pledged collateral  
becomes the object of the security offered against a debt. See also art. 2742 and 2743 
Italian Civil Code (hence “ICC”); art. 2795 ICC; art. 2802 and 2803 ICC; art.2815 
and 2816 ICC; art.2825, 2nd par. ICC. 
99 See GABRIELLI, E. Il pegno anomalo, Padua,Giuffrè, 1990. 
100 The decisions are widely reported and commentated on: see for instance 
Tribunale di Roma (Lower Court of Rome), 21st of July 1993, but also Tribunale di 
Torino (Lower Court of Turin), 1st of June 1991 and 22nd of July 1992. 
101 See Corte di Cassazione, decision  28th of May 2005, n.5264. The first 
comments on the decision of the Corte di Cassazione underscore the fact that the 
High Court caved in on this type of floating charge under the pressure of the doctrinal 
formant. See AZZARO, A.M. “Il pegno ‘rotativo’ arriva in Cassazione: ovvero ‘ 
come la dottrina diventa giurisprudenza’”, in Banca Borsa e Titoli di Credito,5 
(1998): 1; MAIMER, F. “Pegno rotativo: la dottrina ispira la Cassazione. Prime 
osservazioni”, in Giustizia Civile, 9 (1998): 2159. See also RESCIGNO, M. “Le 
garanzie ‘rotative’ convenzionali: fattispecie e problemi di disciplina”, in Banca, 
Borsa e Titoli di credito, 1 (2001) :1.   
102See also art. 34, 2nd par., D.Lgs 24th of June 1998, n.213 ( so-called “Decree on 
the Euro”).  
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As regards law-making in a ‘strong sense’ as previously defined, I 
have already underscored the dynamics of the judicial review of legislation as 
well as the influence exerted by the Constitutional Court in providing the 
legal framework necessary to grant the enforcement of fundamental rights: 
that is, the role played by the Constitutional Court in making the 
constitutional project real. As regards law shaping, the Italian legal system 
does not treat case law as a formal source of law. Thus, decisions and 
opinions issued by the judiciary in its own capacity will constitute, on the one 
hand, the substantive rule to be applied in the case in question; on the other 
hand, judges will hold an informal, though effectual, power to shape the law 
concerning the subject matter being considered. If the decisions are made by 
ordinary courts, that is, lower courts and courts of appeal dealing both with 
civil and criminal matters, they will only represent trends of approach; if the 
decisions are taken by higher jurisdictions, they will have a flexible binding 
force, mainly by means of a mild implementation of the stare decisis 
principle.103 Hence, although not counted among the sources of Italian law, 
case law and judges’ opinions must be included among the formants making 
up or giving the current shape to general rules, either pre-existing, or to be 
found through the systematic or analogical interpretation of legal principles. 
The careful consideration of case law, then, turns out to be crucial for the 
purposes of law finding.104  
 
                                                 
103 As for the principle in question, there is an increasing awareness of the path 
dependence to be traced in Italian case law; the phenomenon is multi-faceted and 
involves both elements of legal culture and of ideology, referring, with this latter 
term, to the confines marked (by legislator but also by academics and judges) for 
judicial interpretation within the legal system. Positive legal constraints and judicial 
standards of civil liability for the judge are also part of the framework that shapes 
path dependence in Italian case law. The investigation of the (supposed) 
presence/absence of the stare decisis principle in the Italian legal system is beyond 
the scope of this paper. For further references on this issue see VISINTINI, G. La 
giurisprudenza per massime ed il valore del precedente con particolare riguardo alla 
responsabilità civile, Padua, Cedam, 1988; GALGANO, F. “L’efficacia vincolante 
del precedente di Cassazione”, in Contratto e Impresa, 1999, 889-904.; 
MAZZAMUTO, S. “Certezza e prevedibilità: nuove frontiere della nomofilachia e 
tentativi di enforcement del precedente”, in Politica del diritto, 2 (2003):157-176.  
104 See also ALPA, G., MONATERI, P.G., GUARNIERI, A. Le fonti del diritto 
italiano. Le fonti non scritte Turin,. Utet, 1999. The awareness of the relevance of 
case law for law-finding purposes has given way to a relatively new genre  of legal 
literature, i.e. that of the commentaries on case law. As regards contract law, see for 
instance DOGLIOTTI, M., FIGONE, A.Giurisprudenza del contratto Milan,, Giuffrè, 
2000. 
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As a consequence of this and despite the traditional tale about 
codified systems neglecting the role of the judiciary, it is now a shared 
assumption among academics and practitioners that even in a Civil Law 
(entrambi minuscoli o entrambi maiuscoli) system the judiciary’s contribution 
is crucial both to law shaping and to law making. Indeed, its counterpoint in 
common law legal environments is represented by the piercing of the veil of 
“the artificial differentiation between the binding authority of the cases and 
the merely persuasive authority of the other literature.”105 
 
The relationship between the judges and the law in a codified system 
bears certain peculiarities, among which must be numbered the interaction 
between codified rules and statutory law. What has been noted in the analysis 
of the new codification of Dutch private law can be applied to other codified 
systems in general:  
 
the general part of private law is aere perennius, more durable than 
bronze. The legislature is merely concerned with branches of the law 
that are sensitive to changing developments and attitudes in 
society…[…]As statutory law ages, the role of the courts becomes 
more substantial. Since the general part of the Code is rarely 
amended, it is that area of private law where the court’s influence is 
greatest.106 
 
The aforementioned current of investigation has underscored two 
levels at which the influence of the judges on law-making is exercised: a. 
declaring what law is relevant to the case in hand; b. setting a rule which 
might be considered valid beyond the case in hand.107 However, taking for 
granted these conclusions, it is necessary to focus attention on the practical 
modes in which the judges’ contribution to law shaping is realized. 
 
The first mode to be considered is that of giving a solution to the case 
in hand, provided that a rule for the case is already present: in doing so, the 
judge interprets the law often fostering legal change via systematic 
interpretation. The contribution of the judges to legal change is undisputed, 
for instance, in the field of family law, which has been adapted by the Courts 
to a changed social context; both the Court of Cassation and the 
                                                 
105 See BIRKS, P. , (1997) supra fn. 18, at p.114. 
106 See HARTKAMP, A. “Interplay Between Judges, Legislators and Academics. 
The case of the New Civil Code of the Netherlands.”, in MARKESINIS, B., (1997) 
supra fn.18, p.91-112, at p.91 
107 See GORLA, G. (1981) supra fn. 67, at p.273. 
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Constitutional Court have played a role in this process. The institution of the 
legitimate family, as set up in art. 29 of the Italian Constitution and regulated 
by art.79-219 of the Italian Civil Code, still retains its prominence in 
comparison with other forms of personal relationship acknowledged by 
private law. Major developments have been achieved in the extension of the 
applicability of means of protection – already provided for married couples – 
to couples cohabiting more uxorio. The Constitutional Court, after 
recognizing the juridical relevance of the personal relationship between 
unmarried partners, has stated that art.6 of the Law n.392/1978 on housing 
must also be applied to unmarried partners. The rule provided the 
husband/wife with the right to replace the deceased husband/wife as party to 
the lease contract. In the same decision the court also stated that when 
cohabitation had ceased, but there were still children, the rules on separation 
must be applied (the partner who cohabits with children is granted ex lege the 
right to keep the house).108 The High Court followed suit and in several 
decisions granted protection to the children born from unmarried couples, 
recasting the means of protection provided by the Civil Code and stating their 
applicability to cohabitants more uxorio. 109 
 
A second mode of law shaping may be traced in the reception of 
theories and a new systematisation expressly advanced by doctrine. These 
developments of the legal system, though achieved through case law, are 
supported and recommended by a lively juridical scholarship which maintains 
a constant dialogue with the judges. An example of this beneficial interaction 
between formants is well represented by the history of the availability of an 
action under art.2043 of the Italian Civil code for recovering damages in the 
case of a creditor whose contractual rights had been impaired on account of a 
wrongful act by a third party. Until 1971, art. 2043 of the Italian Civil Code 
was interpreted by judges as contemplating only the case of wrongful acts 
which may have caused an infringement of absolute rights, thus leaving out of 
the scope of the provision those cases of wrongful acts which may have 
caused infringement of contractual rights. The Corte di Cassazione finally 
came to accept the systematisation suggested by doctrine, hence granting 
compensation for damages suffered by a creditor and caused by a third 
party.110  
                                                 
108 See Constitutional Court, decision n.404/1988.  
109 See, for instance, Corte di Cassazione, decision n.376/1999; decision n. 
10797/1998; decision n.10538/1996. 
110 The case which gave way to the pivotal revirement is well known: Corte di 
Cassazione, 26th of January 1971, n.174 (the “Meroni case”). A summary of the case 
is offered in BUSSANI, M., POZZO, B, VENCHIARUTTI, “Tort Law”, in 
MATTEI, U., LENA, J.(2002) supra fn.7, pp.217-246, at p.236-238. 
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A third mode of law shaping performed by judges can be traced in the 
gap-filling activity carried out in deciding cases regarding incomplete 
contracts. Often neglected by Italian legal literature, the gap-filling activity of 
the judge represents a crucial intersection between State regulation and 
private actors’ regulation.111 In the last paragraph of this section I will briefly 
examine relevant features of the gap-filling activity of the judge and I will 
provide an example of the latter in the area of contract law. 
 
III.2.3. Law shaping: the gap-filling activity of the judge 
 
In exploring the balances reached in the paradigm of the separation of 
powers through the allocation of law-making functions, the gap -filling 
activity of the judge must not be underrated. The possibility (or the 
desirability) of a judicial intervention in the appraisal and in the definition of 
the content of contractual clauses involves a formalization of the institutional 
scope of judicial activity. This relationship has been built in terms of radical 
opposition by formalist theories of contract law.112 The model of institutional 
opposition between State and private parties is transferred to the level of 
contractual rules; cost-wise, the best regulator for the contract is always the 
parties themselves. State legislation (default rules) and Court adjudications 
are costly and less efficient. On the contrary, a relation of complementarities 
between State regulation and the regulation put in place by private actors has 
been advocated by those who try to reach a balance in the mixed system of 
institutional/ non-institutional cooperation.113 Two aspects of the problem are 
taken into consideration: the costs of laying down a (contractual) rule and the 
definition of the borderlines between the law-making power of institutional 
and that of non-institutional actors. Hence, the cost-benefit analysis not being 
relevant to my present purposes, the reference to the gap-filling activity of the 
judges is presented here in order to shed light on that grey area of 
complementarities which judges, though under the false flag of interpretation, 
                                                                                                                    
The same doctrine is at the basis of the possibility of granting compensation for 
economic losses. The scholar who has forecast this legal change is F.D. BUSNELLI, 
in La lesione del credito da parte di terzi, Milan Giuffrè, 1964. 
111 See BELLANTUONO, G. I contratti incompleti nel diritto e nell’economia, 
Padua  Cedam, 2000. 
112 See SCHWARTZ, A., “Relational Contracts in the Courts: An analysis of 
Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies”, in Journal of Legal Studies, 21 
(1992), 2: 271-318.  
113 As regards Italian Contract law, see BELLANTUONO, G. “Contratti 
incompleti e norme sociali”, in Rivista Critica del Diritto Privato, 2001, p261-294,  at 
p.275, and further references contained therein. 
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enter in order to regulate authoritatively the dominium of private parties, that 
is, the contract. 
 
In their gap-filling activity, judges are formally bound by the law: in 
this regard art. 101of the Italian Constitution, providing that judges are bound 
“only by the law”, plays a pivotal role: in line with the fundamental idea of 
the division of powers, the judiciary should not be subjected to any constraint 
other than the law itself. Rules governing interpretation are also to be found in 
the law, and, in particular, in the Civil Code itself.114 Legal constraints on the 
gap-filling activity of judges may also differ according to which area of law is 
taken into account, as stated in art.14 of the Preliminary Dispositions to the 
Civil Code. In civil matters, rules on interpretation are provided at art.12 of 
the Preliminary Dispositions, where legal techniques available for the judges 
are also contemplated. Relevant provisions are contained in art.1175, 1322, 
1323, 1324, whilst the specific rules on the interpretation of contracts are set 
out in art.1362-1371. Among these provisions art.1366 (good faith) deserves 
special attention. This has provided the legal base for the recognition of 
further duties of cooperation between the parties. 
 
It may seem that in a codified system of private law, the room for 
manoeuvre left to the judge s is reduced and, indeed, legal constraints do 
delimit the scope of the gap filling activity. Furthermore, these restraint work 
in different way s with respect to civil or commercial contracts, depending on 
the evolution of general principles governing the specific subject matters. 
However, several provisions expressly attributing gap -filling power to the 
judges may be found in the system. The discipline of warranties in sale 
contracts offers some examples; on this point, European regulations place 
emphasis on the protection of the weaker party in a transaction (already 
present in the system, see art. 1341 c.c.), thus providing a new interpretative 
framework for art.1512 of the Italian Civil Code: in this latter case, for 
instance, the objective purport of the provision has been enhanced by the 
Courts.115 In other cases the Corte di Cassazione has acknowledged an 
implicit obligation resting on the seller, the purpose of which is the to 
guarantee the regular functionality (“buon funzionamento”) of the item for 
                                                 
114 Art. 23, 24, 25 and 28, as well as 102, 111 and 113 are also important, since 
they provide the institutional framework for the exercise of judiciary power, 
especially by determining legal sanctions for the abuse of powers or for judges’ 
liability(see also L.n117, 13th of April 1988, in particular art. 2,3. This statute cleared 
the opposite interpretations provided by two judgements of Corte di Cassazione on 
the subject: Cass. Sez. Un. 6th of November 1975 and Cass. Sez. Un. 24th of March 
1982 n.1879). 
115 See  Corte di Cassazione, decision  n.22661/1999 and decision n.8153/2000. 
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sale.116 No such implicit obligation has been acknowledged in sales between 
private parties; thus the protection provided by art.1512 I. c.c will be 
applicable to sales between private parties only if expressly contained in the 
contract.117 
 
Nevertheless, these constraints are balanced by the power of the judge 
to select the facts to be taken into account in order to decide the case in 
hand.118 Though not explicitly spelled out, but only covered by “thick ” 
layers, such as the legal techniques of interpretation or positive law 
constraints, the gap filling powers of judges can be deployed to pierce the veil 
of contractual autonomy. The clause giving way to these powers might be 
seen in art. 116 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure, as mentioned above; 
the only limit to this power is the necessary correspondence between petitum 
and iudicatum established by art.112 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure. 
 
The question of whether or not a judge may substantially modify the 
content of the contract is rarely addressed per se by the Courts, but in recent 
times the Corte di Cassazione has sought to issue several decisions in which 
the gap-filling powers of the judge are discussed in the light of the possible 
balances between the exercise of private autonomy and the authoritative 
control exercised by the judiciary.119  
 
IV. From the ‘rules’ to the general picture. 
 
In the previous sections I have provided an analytical framework for 
the processes underpinning the contribution of institutional and quasi-
institutional actors to both law making and law shaping. At this stage it is thus 
                                                 
116 See Corte di Cassazione, decision n.325771983, interpreting the part of the 
provision which establishes that the particular kind of warranty must be agreed upon 
by the parties, unless usages provide that the warranty is to be acknowledged 
implicitly. 
117See ALPA, G. “Autonomia privata e ‘garanzie’ commerciali”, in Contratto e 
Impresa Europa, 2001, pp.455-496. 
118 See art.116 Code of Civil Procedure and art.2729 Civil Code. See also Corte 
di Cassazione, decision  n.4333/1983. 
119 See Corte di Cassazione, decision n.10511/1999;  decision n.14172/2000 
and recently decision n.18128/2005 . All the above-mentioned decisions 
concerned the interpretation of art. 1384 of the Italian Civil Code, which runs as 
follows: “Riduzione della penale. La penale può essere diminuita equamente dal 
giudice, se l'obbligazione principale è stata eseguita in parte ovvero se 
l'ammontare della penale è manifestamente eccessivo, avuto sempre riguardo 
all'interesse che il creditore aveva all'adempimento “.  
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necessary to verify, in a positive dimension, whether the assumption of a 
substantive discontinuity between the constitutional model and the legal 
system in action is proven or not. The answers provided in this paper will 
substantiate, in a normative perspective, some concluding remarks on the 
effects that the allocation of law-making functions produces on the paradigm 
of the separation of powers. 
 
As regards the first issue, for each class of actors the outlines of 
significant “implicit constitutional change” have been underscored, thus 
substantiating the initial assumption.120 
 
At the outset of the analysis, I discussed the relationship between the 
constitutional text and other pieces of legislation: the enactment of the 
Constitution itself and the enforcement of the values enshrined in it have 
radically changed the contents of the legal system. The main actor in this 
process has been the Constitutional Court, but parts have also been played by 
the Judiciary through adjudication and by the application of ‘horizontal effect’ 
doctrine. The analysis has also revealed the importance of the institution of 
the referendum in the transformation of the legal system itself. The dynamics 
of the use of this institution appear to be those of truly direct democracy 
rather than those of the checks and balances pattern, as laid down in the 
constitutional text. In this case the Constitutional Court’s role turns out to be 
crucial in mediating between the demands of change coming from civil 
society and the institutional response. Setting aside the latest constitutional 
reform, whose destiny hangs under the threat of a referendum, the shift from 
monism to dualism and beyond undoubtedly provides evidence for the alleged 
discontinuity. The Government has progressively eroded parliamentary 
legislative prerogatives; furthermore, the process of implementation of the 
constitutional reform granting legislative power to the regions and the other 
local representative bodies has given rise to a quasi-permanent conflict of 
attribution between the executive power, the State legislator and, to a large 
extent, the regional legislator. In this framework I have underscored how the 
role of the Constitutional Court is not only that of an arbiter of legality who 
pursues the implementation of the given constitutional design.  
 
                                                 
120 For the concept of “implicit constitutional change” in a Law & Economics’ 
perspective see the model of institutional interaction presented by VOIGT, S. 
“Implicit Constitutional Change – Changing the Meaning of the Constitution Without 
Changing the Text of the Document”, in European Journal of Law & Economics, 7 
(1999):197-224. However, it must be noted that the idea of a de facto constitution has 
been widely discussed and accepted in Italian Constitutional theory. 
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The Court indeed in its capacity of a hierarchically superior 
interpreter continuously shapes the institutional design, functioning as a 
mediator in the competition for the allocation of legislative functions between 
the executive and the legislative power, whether residing in Parliament or in 
local representative bodies. This interpretation is in line with the learned 
current of constitutional theory according to which the legal system can be 
seen as a complex set of rules deriving from normative facts and acts that are 
consistent with the abstract models provided by the norms on legislative 
production; this set of rules is coherently unified by the interpretative activity 
of institutional actors and by the action of quasi-institutional actors. The 
discontinuities between the abstract model and the rules that govern in 
practice are but one characteristic of the law.121 Furthermore, the 
Constitutional Court’s action also has substantive effects on the contents of 
the legal system, both re-modeling current legislation with a view to 
harmonising it with constitutional values and fostering prospective change in 
the legal system, thus steering the policy-making process as well as taking an 
active part in it. 
 
The dynamics underscored in the law-making process appear to be 
consistent with those traced for the law-shaping process. On this issue, 
ordinary courts have gradually gained increasing importance in defining the 
limits and the contents of the legal issues under their jurisdiction. In 
performing this function of law shaping, they also traced a line of demarcation 
for private autonomy, as noted earlier in particular in the field of the 
adjudication of incomplete contracts. The influence exerted by a peculiar type 
of quasi-institutional actor, the lawyers, on law shaping has also proved to be 
substantial, despite the limited acknowledgement obtained by formal 
institutional design. 
 
The analysis of the basic features of law-finding patterns in the Italian 
legal system allows me now to make some observations on the effect of the 
allocation of legislative functions on the separation of powers. The allocation 
of legislative functions to bodies deriving their legitimacy from the fact that 
they have been elected by the people is related to the idea that policy 
objectives and, in particular, redistributive policies, are pursued in a fair way 
only by democratic representative powers (the majoritarian model). However, 
the dynamics illustrated in this paper provides relevant examples of a 
deviation from the strict majoritarian paradigm that is reputed to govern the 
Italian legal system. While the text of the Constitution and the formal theory 
of the sources of law assume the majoritarian model of democracy as the 
                                                 
121 See PIZZORUSSO, A., FERRERI, S. , supra fn. 26, at p.46-47. 
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dominating pattern for law finding, the above-mentioned deviations show 
how in practice more “Madisonian” balances are constantly negotiated in 
practice.122  As regards the action of the institutional and quasi-institutional 
actors as analysed in this paper, a tendency to correct the failures of the 
majoritarian model appears clearly from the role gained by the Constitutional 
Court and by the judiciary in general; on the other hand, a substantive 
influence is advocated and exerted both by civil society, via direct democracy 
instruments and/or active participation in the task of system building. The role 
of lawyers in the administration of justice helps to weaken (?) the idea of the 
Judiciary as a third giant able to dodge any kind of wide-ranging democratic 
control; furthermore, it constitutes an important example of cooperation 
between actors in the law-shaping process.   
 
By way of conclusion, the paradigm of the separation of powers turns 
out to be more fragmented than the level of black letter rules allows it to be 
perceived. This fragmentation is not necessarily a negative development; on 
the contrary, it seems to me that both in relation to institutional design and 
political theory and in relation to the evolution of regulation theory, the shifts 
and adjustments highlighted in the allocations of legislative function 
demonstrate the endeavour to achieve a better coordination and more efficient 
results in law making. From the former viewpoint and bearing in mind the 
lesson taught by liberal thought, both the social structures designed to fulfil 
the requirements of legislation and the tasks of public order need to be 
conceived as changing under varying circumstances.123 In line with the 
observation of the father of classical economy, the paths in law finding as 
analysed in this paper appear to follow the model of “balanced government.” 
 
Moreover, the outlines of such a negotiated institutional balance 
appear to constitute the positive ground on which, in a normative dimension, 
the sharp opposition between the logic of law-making discourse and the logic 
of regulation discourse might be blunted. In regulation theory, the reasons for 
opting out of the majoritarian model and a consequent option in favour of 
allocating regulatory powers to non-majoritarian institutions have been 
described, in a nutshell, in terms of efficiency, credibility and legitimacy 
                                                 
122 See LIJPHART, A. “Majority Rule in Theory and Practice: the Tenacity of a 
Flawed Paradigm”, in International Social science Journal, 129 (1991):483-493.  
For a description of the majoritarian model as opposed to a non majoritarian 
(madisonian) model, see DAHL , R.A. A preface to Democratic theory, Chicago, The 
University of Chicago Press, 1956. 
123 See SMITH, A. Lectures on Jurisprudence, in The Glasgow edition o the 
works and correspondence of Adam Smith, Vol.1-6, Oxford, Clarendon Press, New 
York, OUP, 1976-1983, vol.5.   
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goals.124 The polar opposition between efficiency and redistribution as 
alternative roots capable of strengthening the regulatory powers of non -state 
actors is nevertheless contested as incapable of explaining the idiosyncratic 
characteristics of each and every regulatory domain.125 I am not suggesting 
here that the latter binomial does (or ought to) constitute an ever-valid 
criterion in assigning portions of legislative powers instead of the pattern of 
the separation of powers, displayed in constitutions. However, on the one 
hand, the analysis of the way in which legislative functions are allocated and 
exerted in practice does show the inadequacy of the traditional pattern if we 
are to grasp the multiform relationships between law making, institutional 
design and the legal system. On the other hand, the fragmented dynamics that 
govern the complementary processes of law making and law shaping offer 
examples of interaction between institutional actors and between institutional 
and quasi-institutional actors that make the real functioning of the pattern 
closer to the paths and the logic of regulation.  
                                                 
124 In regulation theory, see MAJONE, G. Lo Stato Regolatore, Bologne,  Il 
Mulino, , 2000, at p. 167-173. 
125 On this issue as a first reference, see the picture provided by KAHN, A.E. The 
economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions. Vol.1 Economic principles, NY- 
London- Sidney –Toronto, John Wiley & Sons. Inc., 1970, at p.12-14. A discussion of 
the unitary theories of regulation and a vast array of bibliographical reference is 
provided by STEWART, R.B. “Regulation in a Liberal State: the Role of Non-
Commodity Values”, in Yale Law Journal, 92 (1982-1983): 1537-1590. 
